

NOTES

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NOTE A, p. 6.

It has not been thought necessary to allude in the text to the old objection, that the two narratives of the Ascension in the Gospel and in the Acts of St. Luke are inconsistent with each other, inasmuch as the one is alleged to place the event on the very day of the Resurrection, the other forty days thereafter. But, as this objection has been recently revived by Pfeiderer in his *Ur-Christenthum* (p. 548), it may be proper to say a few words regarding it. Pfeiderer, indeed, does not directly urge that the two accounts are contradictory. His inference rather is, that a comparison of the two shows how lightly St. Luke regarded such contradictions in narratives of the same event ("wie leicht es Lukas mit solchen Widersprüchen bei der Wiederholung einer und derselben Erzählung nahm"); and in proof of this he refers to chaps ix., xxii., xxvi. of Acts, meaning, without doubt, the three narratives of the conversion of St. Paul contained in these chapters. As to this last point, he has not adverted to the fact that only one of these is from St. Luke's own pen, the other two being given as St. Paul's statements before different audiences, and bearing precisely such slight marks of divergence as might be expected, and as strengthen rather than weaken our confidence in the main accuracy of a narrator. He has also paid too little heed either to St. Luke's preface to his Gospel or to the general style of both his books, which demonstrate that whatever complaints may be made of their author, indifference to historical details is the last charge that ought to be brought against him. In the present instance also we may well ask why Pfeiderer should not allow, what he had allowed in an earlier part of his work

(p. 478), when speaking of the same fact, that St. Luke's brevity in his Gospel, if certain words are not genuine, arose from this and this alone ("wohl nur darum"), that he already intended to give a fuller statement in his second book. Here, at any rate, the explanation of the apparent divergence is to be found, and this all the more if the words of Luke xxiv. 51, *καὶ ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*, are to be treated as a gloss. With much more propriety might it be pleaded that the Gospel places a *first* Ascension on the Resurrection day, and that that placed in Acts, forty days afterwards, is the *final* and formal departure. In any case there is no contradiction between the two accounts.

NOTE B, p. 149.

The view taken in the text as to the Offering of our Lord has so important a bearing upon the great doctrine of the Atonement that it seems desirable to enter somewhat more fully into it in a note. Not that the substance of that doctrine, as generally held by the different branches of the Church of Christ, and stated in their symbolical books, is affected by what has been said. Let us apply the Saviour's test, "By their fruits ye shall know them" (Matt. vii. 16); let us reason as does St. Paul when he appeals to the practical experience of the Galatian or the Corinthian Christians (Gal. iii. 1-5; 1 Cor. i. 4-8, xii. 1-3); let us believe that the promise of our Lord to His disciples has not been an illusion, "Howbeit, when He, the Spirit, is come, He shall guide you into all the truth" (John xvi. 13), and we shall be constrained to admit that the doctrine of Christ's sacrifice of Himself for the sins of men, acknowledged and taught by His Church, cannot have been false. As "the power of God" it must also have been "the wisdom of God." It does not, however, follow from this that the doctrine may not be looked at from different points of view, or even that the form in which it is expressed may not be to some extent changed. It has been so in the past, and may be so in the future. A distinction may be drawn between the substance of any condensed statement of Scripture teaching and the mode in which the substance of that teaching is set forth.

Proceeding upon this principle, the aim of the following remarks is to endeavour to place the view presented in this volume of the Offering of our Lord in its right relation to one

or two leading ideas deeply embedded in the experience of Christian men; to the demands of the heart seeking after salvation; to the teaching of Scripture; and to the religious life and theology of the Reformed Church. The aim is so wide that what is to be said on these points must be stated briefly.

I. Any just conception of the Offering of our Lord ought to recognise and take up one or two leading ideas embedded in the experience of the Church. The ideas here particularly alluded to are those of the *Substitution* of our Lord as a victim for us, and the *Imputation* of His righteousness to us.

(1.) Substitution. It is hardly necessary to say that the thought of Christ as a Substitute for His people, as One who in their stead endured the penalty of the Divine law which they had violated, and at the same time rendered to it that perfect obedience of which they were through sin incapable, has always been largely entertained in the Christian Church. Dr. Buchanan speaks of it as one of the "fundamental principles" which cannot be discarded without undermining the ground on which the Scriptural doctrine of pardon and acceptance with God must rest" (*The Doctrine of Justification*, p. 190), and by the popular mind it is generally supposed to contain the very essence of the Gospel. To what extent is it allowed by the view taken in the Lectures? The term "Substitute," it may first be observed, is ambiguous. In its strict sense it means one who does something for us that we cannot do for ourselves, and who, by doing it, makes it unnecessary for us to repeat the act. No one contends that this full meaning of the word is applicable to the case before us. On the contrary, all admit that the highest end of the work of Christ is to make us like Him, in the virtues not less than the privileges of the Divine life. By what our Lord does for us we are not relieved from doing: we are the more bound to do. A similar remark applies to suffering. We are not released from suffering because Christ has suffered. On the contrary, all allow that, while the Christian has to meet the ordinary sufferings of this life, he has over and above them to bear a cross, and to make a sacrifice of himself for his own and his brother's good, the value, and even the necessity, of which he learns from Christian faith alone. To the true disciple of Christ suffering may have changed its character; or rather, it should perhaps be said, there are consolations and hopes afforded under it which enable

him even while he sorrows to rejoice. But suffering continues. Nor only so. Suffering can never be separated from the thought of the wrath of God against sin, or from the thought of penalty. The solidarity of the race, the intimateness of the bond uniting each man to all his brethren, alike in their sins and in the consequences of their sins, is enough to render the thought of this connexion necessary. Our suffering for sin is not removed because Christ suffered for us. As with suffering, so with death. The two accompany each other. Had there been no death, there would have been no suffering. But death reigns though Jesus died. Its character, like that of suffering, may have been changed to the believer; or rather, it should perhaps be said, the believer gains such a victory over it as enables him to cry, "O death, where is thy victory?" Death, however, not only still asserts its power; it must always be associated with the thought of what it is in itself, "the wages of sin." Dying as a consequence of sin is not removed because Christ died.

The term "our substitute" cannot, therefore, be applied to our Lord in its strictest and most proper sense, and theologians seem to have felt this. Nothing is more common than to find them combining the word Representative with the word Substitute. They speak of our Lord as our "Representative and Substitute" (Buchanan, u. s. p. 330), and they leave the impression upon the reader that the two words are regarded by them as synonymous. The theology of Scotland, too, does not use the word in any of its more formal documents. We meet it neither in the Westminster Confession of Faith nor in the Larger or Shorter Catechism of the Scottish Church.

Here, then, the view taken in these Lectures of the work of Christ on our behalf appears to lend us aid. It enables us to present to ourselves that work in a manner by which we escape the difficulties of a merely popular theology, while at the same time we retain the truth of which that theology is an imperfect and onesided expression. It would certainly avoid the word "Substitute," because that word is ambiguous and misleading. But it is *grounded* on the idea that Christ is the Representative of sinners. It acknowledges that there is no part of His work in which Christ stands alone, and that He enters upon and executes that work not for Himself but *for us*. It allows that He does for us what we cannot do for ourselves, and that His relation to His people is altogether different from that of a

mere Friend or Benefactor or Example. He represents them; yet by a representation which is more than one of outward appointment, which rests upon an internal reality, and an internal correspondence with the essential elements of their state. He becomes what they are, that they in Him may become what He is. Through faith in the Personal Redeemer, brought before them in the message of the Gospel, they are made members of His Body, and one with Him the Head. They accept Him as their Representative. They go to the Father not in their own name but in His.

All this, it may perhaps be said, applies to the life of Christ; but where, upon the supposition now made, is that death which is the wages of sin? The answer is not difficult. Christ does die. It is true that physical death does not constitute the essence of His atoning work. That essence lies in the surrender of His will to the will of God, in the love which led Him to the Cross in order to execute, at the cost of life itself, the counsels of the Father's love. But still He does die. He passes through death in order to satisfy the great law of righteousness. He bears the punishment, the "curse" of a broken law, and what He offers is the life bearing that penalty, and reaching, while it bears it, its most glorious perfection. With Him and in Him His people also die. While by a living act they appropriate Him they both live and die. Their life is a life which passes through death. There is death for them as well as life.¹

(2.) Imputation. Here again it is of importance to distinguish between the popular conception and the scientific statement of the truth. According to the former it is generally supposed that the righteousness of Christ, both active and passive, having been wrought out in our room and stead, is imputed or reckoned to us in our natural state of sinfulness on the sole condition that we accept it; and that the Judge of all

¹ On the question of substitution the writer would refer his readers to an elaborate and able work by the Rev. G. Jamieson, D.D., first minister of Old Machar, Aberdeen, entitled, *Discussions on the Atonement*. The writer may not have brought out the different senses in which the word "substitution" is to be understood, and he may have

devoted himself at unnecessary length to an argument against it when only taken in its narrower sense. With some positions too laid down by him in the course of his argument it may be impossible to sympathise; but the work is full of valuable thought, and deserves the careful attention of the theological student.

the earth, then beholding us clothed in it as in a spotless robe, is well pleased with us for His righteousness' sake. The figure of a robe indeed is that most frequently employed to give expression to the idea. Naturally we are naked, but we put on Christ's righteousness as a garment, and we are saved. From this conception the scientific statement of the truth wholly differs. "The Reformers," says Principal Cunningham, and his words may be quoted as authoritative, "taught that, when God pardoned and accepted any sinner, the ground or basis of the Divine act—that to which God had directly and immediately a respect or regard in performing it, or in passing a virtual sentence cancelling that man's sins, and admitting him into the enjoyment of His favour—was this, that the righteousness of Christ was his, *through his union to Christ*; that being his in this way it was *in consequence* imputed to him, or put down to his account, just as if it were truly and properly his own; and that this righteousness, being in itself fully satisfactory and meritorious, formed an adequate ground on which his sins might be forgiven and his person accepted" (*Historical Theology*, ii. 46). The words of this extract, "*through his union to Christ*," which are italicised by Dr. Cunningham himself, imply much more than a mere outward relationship between Christ and the believer at the moment when Christ's righteousness is imputed. Union, by its very nature, supposes in the case of living persons an internal movement, a movement of the heart of man towards Christ, and a communication to some extent at least of the affections of Christ to man. Imputation of Christ's righteousness thus *follows* and does not *precede* our union to Christ; and it becomes an expression, not for that by which we are saved (for we are saved by union to Christ), but for that by which an absolutely holy and righteous God is enabled to deal with us as though we had, what we have not, the perfect righteousness which the law requires. When the word "imputation" is understood in this sense not only is there no ground of objection to it, it must be accepted even in those lower theories of justification on which we have no space to enter. (Comp. Buchanan on Justification, Part I. Lect. vi.) It even offers a point of connexion between Roman and Protestant theology. The Roman Church maintains that "the meritorious cause of justification is our Lord Jesus Christ who, by His own most sacred passion on the Cross, merited justification for us, and

satisfied the Father in our room ;"¹ and, however unhappily it introduced confusion into the subject by its definition of "the formal cause" of the same great act of God, confusion is not contradiction. It may be removed by a proper definition of terms, and a fuller consideration of what those employing them intended them to convey.

The idea of "imputation" then, as above explained, belongs essentially to the view of Christ's Offering taken in the Lectures. When the sinner believes in Christ he is united to Him; but not outwardly only. He lays hold of Christ as a living Redeemer who passes through a penal death for his sake. He is with Him in that death. In other words, He lays hold of the life of Christ in its aspect as an offering to God. His life has moved to Christ's life, and Christ has identified Himself with him. But he is not perfect. How is he then accepted? The Father beholds him in His "Beloved." So beholding him, He beholds him truly united to the Son of His love; in that union He beholds also the germ out of which the life of a complete sanctification will spring; and He turns away from the sins and weaknesses which still cleave to him. In other words, He imputes Christ's righteousness to the believer for that particular purpose, and to that particular extent.

It is no doubt true that, while thus retained in their theological and scientific import, the popular misconceptions as to Substitution and Imputation perish. But can any one regret that they should do so? Do they not go far to account for those hypocrisies and vices by which even Office-bearers in the Church have too often done dishonour to the Christian faith, and for that separation between Christianity and the daily life which marks too many professing followers of Christ in Scotland at this hour?² *

II. The view now taken of the Offering of our Lord gives

¹ The following are the words of the Council of Trent: "Meritoria (causa) autem, dilectissimus unigenitus suus, dominus noster Jesus Christus, qui cum essemus inimici, propter nimiam caritatem, qui dilexit nos sua sanctissima passione in ligno crucis nobis justificationem meruit, et pro nobis Deo Patri satisfecit" (Sessio Sexta—See *Chemnitz's Examen*, p. 127).

² The wide prevalence of this conception, and the mischief done by it are strikingly illustrated by what the writer has been told, upon apparently the best authority, was everywhere said in Glasgow after the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank with all its disastrous consequences. See "*the fruits of Imputed Righteousness.*"

prominence to that moral or religious element in the plan of our salvation which is not less needed than the legal element to satisfy the conscience and the heart of man. Of its retention of the legal element little further need be said. It recognises the claims of the Divine law, and the satisfaction rendered to them by Him who gave Himself for us, the Just for the unjust, that He might bring us unto God. Upon the Cross the Redeemer dies no merely martyr's death; nor does He die only that He may seal His testimony with His blood, or that He may open for us the gate of heaven. There is a penal element in His death. Bearing their sins in His own body on the tree, He takes up into Himself, and, with their full and free acceptance of His work, represents before the throne of God those who have the sentence of death in themselves, and who cannot be delivered from their bondage unless they see that the claims of law are satisfied, and that that eternal righteousness which fills them as much with admiration as with alarm is vindicated. Thus the legal element finds its place.

It is of more consequence to turn to the fact that, when our Lord's Offering is regarded not as an Offering of death but of life in and through death, it includes in it as an *integral part* of the gift bestowed, a moral or religious element, not less necessary to appease the awakened conscience than is the assurance that punishment has been endured for sin. A sense of guilt, or of liability to just punishment because of the violation of the Divine law, is not the only thing in our natural condition for which a message of good news is wanted. In innumerable instances such a sense is far less oppressive than the consciousness of sinful tendency, and for this no merely external atonement will suffice.¹ No change in our legal relation to the Almighty can meet that want. Awakened to see what sin is, we long even less for pardon than for reconciliation to God, and, reunion to Him in a willing and welcomed sonship. It would be unjust to the Prodigal Son in the Parable to imagine that, when he resolved to return to his father, he thought only of his own bodily wants, and nothing of that fulness of his father's love which, caring for the humblest domestics of his family, had so richly encompassed his children. And when the Publicans and Sinners "were drawing near unto our Lord for to hear Him" (Luke xv. 1), they were attracted to Him, not

¹ "The mind shrinks from a purely external atonement."—Lytleton, *Lux Mundi*, p. 296.

so much by the hope of pardon, as by a dim perception that in One so holy yet so loving they might find a guide to that better life for which they longed. And so always.¹ We need to be saved out of our sins themselves, before we can be at peace. This, however, cannot be effected by a mere change in our legal relation towards God. Nor is it enough to say that, the legal relation being changed, the practical obedience which flows from gratitude must follow. What the sinner feels most powerfully that he requires to receive is life, spiritual life, and with that life strength to lead it (Rom. v. 6, viii. 3); and to this primary want the message of salvation must be able to address itself. The thought of such life and strength must lie *in the very conception* of that redemption which is made his in Christ. It is not enough to grope after them, to reason to them, or to hope that our feelings will soon be so quickened as to justify a persuasion that we have them. They must be then and there bestowed upon us as a part of the Divine gift, if we are to be at peace. So important does this point seem that one or two other considerations may be briefly adduced in its elucidation and defence.

(1.) Thus alone is justice done to the Person of the Saviour. So long as we occupy ourselves solely or even mainly with legal relations, the Redeemer who reconstitutes these is not embraced by us in that light in which He appears in the New Testament. He is there a spiritual Person who unites His people to Himself by such a real transmission of His Spirit to them that they may be identified with Him, and He with them. But this transmission cannot be made ours without a spiritual activity of the soul which we do not naturally possess, and which must be freely bestowed upon us as a gift. In other words, Christ cannot be to us the Redeemer that He is unless He be as much our religious Representative as our legal Substitute. Then only do we receive Him in the completeness of His character and work when we behold in Him One whose representation of us is made real by His impartation to us of His Spirit in the very act of our receiving Him.

(2.) Thus alone is justice done to the great principle of faith.

¹ "Propitiation is not enough by itself, though propitiation is the necessary first step in the process of reconciliation."—Lyttleton, *Law of the World*, p. 284. "The Gospel of

happiness and misery is not true to the heart of man."—Hinton, *Man and his Dwelling Place*, p. 119; comp. also Jukes, *Law of the Offerings*, p. 201.

For the faith in the Person and Work of Christ, which we are called to exercise, is a faith which possesses in it a moral or religious element; and such faith can only have scope when it is directed not simply to a legal transaction by which we are to profit, but to a living personality which meets and, in meeting, nourishes it into a continually increasing power within us. To think of faith as a mere hand, it might even be an artificial hand, stretched out to appropriate salvation is to mistake its nature. Faith implies trust in the object of faith, and must correspond to that object. In its proper meaning it supposes interchange of sympathy between the person in whom we believe and ourselves; and it is thus more than a principle apprehending a change of legal relation to God, from which the fruits of righteousness ought to grow.

(3.) Thus only is justice done to the true nature of that ground of confidence towards God which the revelation given us in Christ is intended to supply. For this ground of confidence is not any process of reasoning upon our part, or any exercise of feeling by which we respond to the great acts of God's mercy towards us. It is these acts of mercy themselves. This truth is especially apparent in the Sacraments. In them, according to the teaching of the New Testament and of the Standards of the Scottish Church, Christ comes to us as much as we to Him. In them He is by His own appointment "represented, sealed, and applied to believers." They are channels of His grace, so that, when we seek for assurance of salvation, we are to find it in what He does for us, and not in any inward persuasion of our own that we have accepted Him. Such a persuasion enthusiastic or presumptuous persons easily find, and are too frequently puffed up; the modest miss, and are too frequently thrown into agony or despair. Christ Himself is with and in His Sacraments, to make them not only a sign, but a seal to us of "engrafting into Christ, of remission of sins by His blood, and regeneration by His Spirit, of adoption and resurrection unto eternal life" (*Larger Catechism, Question 165*).

So also in the case before us. If Christ is to be our life (and surely that is the light in which He appears chiefly in the New Testament), He must be presented to us and appropriated by us in that character. Our life cannot consist in feelings, emotions, and purposes awakened in us as logical inferences from a work which He has executed in our room and stead. It

must be part of the life summed up in Him and in Him made ours; and this implies the existence of a moral and religious, as well as of a legal element, in that action of the Redeemer by which, through union with Him, we obtain salvation.

The analogy of human affairs appears to sustain this contention. A prisoner at the bar of an earthly judge may hear a sentence of acquittal pronounced over him, while his heart remains unchanged. The sinner is such a prisoner. He has been brought trembling into the midst of a great assize. An awful Judge is upon the bench, and thousands of spectators are around him to justify his doom. He is suddenly and unexpectedly acquitted. He hails his deliverance with joy, and he resolves never to forget the Judge who in his clemency forgave when he might justly have condemned him. Good so far; but the sinner's acquittal brings him into no heart-relation to his Judge. Is the man changed? He may be, or he may not. If he is, there have been deeper thoughts at work within him than he was aware of. What relieves his fears and breaks his bondage is not simply the thought that his relation to the sentence of the law is different from what it was, but that in closest connexion with his pardon full effect is given to his union with One who yielded perfect obedience to God, and in whom he now receives strength to obey.

From all this it follows that the spiritual wants of the sinner, seeking after salvation, are provided for not by the death of Christ alone, but also by the life of Christ as it passes through that death. It has been truly said that "the crucifix with the dead Christ obscures our faith. Our thoughts rest not upon a dead, but upon a living Christ."¹ No doubt the crucifix is to thousands upon thousands a spiritual help, and the figure of our Lord upon the cross preaches to them of the love of God with a power which the words of men can rarely if ever equal. Yet the empty cross is to be preferred, "as being a symbol, not a representation; as symbolising, moreover, the resurrection as well as the death of the Redeemer. He has borne the cross, and passed from it for ever" (Rev. Jas. Cooper, in *Transactions of the Aberdeen Ecclesiological Society*, Part I. p. 13). Few things, indeed, are more striking than the manner in which the sacred writers lead us to the living Christ, and not merely to His death. Even when they speak of Him as the propitiation

¹ Westcott, *The Victory of the Cross*, p. 96.

for our sins, they think of Him as alive. Let one passage from St. John suffice: "And He Himself" (not merely "and He") "is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world" (1 John ii. 2). "He Himself"! Yet not only as a living Lord since His Ascension into heaven, but at the first moment when He was such an offering. Even upon the cross what He offered was "Himself," His life on our behalf; and, if we are His, we are in the life then offered as well as in the death then died.

Perhaps it may be well, before passing on, to say in a single word that, notwithstanding the importance here attached to the moral element in the offering of Christ, the light in which that element has been regarded is not merely different from, but entirely at variance with, the theory known as the Moral Theory of the Atonement. More, however, need not be said. This is not the place to discuss that theory; and the reader may be referred to Dr. Crawford's volume on *The Atonement*, and to Dr. Dale's Preface to the seventh edition of his work on the same subject.

III. The view now taken of the offering of our Lord not only combines the legal and the moral elements necessary to make that offering satisfactory to the conscience: it does justice to an aspect of apostolic teaching too frequently forgotten, and harmonises not a little in the sacred writers that is apt to appear discordant. If there are in the New Testament, upon the one hand, many texts which seem to connect the offering of our Lord more peculiarly with the pardon of sin, or with the removal of our sense of liability to punishment, there are also, on the other hand, texts not less numerous, which describe the chief purpose of that offering as the restoration of man's moral nature, his deliverance from the power of sin, and the implantation of a new Divine life within him. The question to be answered is, Whether, by dwelling too exclusively upon our Lord's death as a penalty for sin, and by failing to associate it at the same time with His offering of life, we do not draw this distinction far more sharply than Scripture does; or whether in Scripture the two elements are not fused more completely into one? Some facts bearing upon the point may be first adverted to.

(1.) The light in which sin is regarded by the sacred writers. It is not merely an act; it is a power within the soul. That *ἀμαρτία* may be used to express an act of sin is indeed true, although it is characteristic of St. Paul's tendency; to penetrate beyond the outward manifestation to the inward principle out

of which it springs, that the word appears to be employed by him in this sense only once, in 2 Cor. xi. 7 (Rom. iv. 8 is a quotation from the Old Testament). It is thus used, however, in Matt. xii. 31 (generally in the Synoptists in the plural), Acts vii. 60, 1 John v. 16, as also in the phrase *ποιεῖν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, John viii. 34, though in the last case the article may lead us to think of the sinful spirit which makes itself manifest in the evil acts of men rather than of these acts considered separately. But, however this may be, there can be no doubt that the word is most commonly employed to denote not sinful acts whether single or continuous, but a force, a power, in the heart by which they are produced. Thus it is equivalent to *ἀνομία* (1 John iii. 4), which never means mere living without law or an act of disobedience to law, but a condition or spirit of direct opposition to it. Thus also its influence is illustrated by many different figures in the writings of St. Paul. It is something that dwells in us (Rom. vii. 17, 20); it uses the body as its instrument (Rom. vi. 6); it possesses a craftiness by means of which it is accustomed to deceive (Heb. iii. 13); it holds man down (Rom. iii. 9); reigns over him (Rom. vi. 12); exercises a lordship over him (Rom. vi. 14); makes him its slave, one sold to it (Rom. vi. 6, John viii. 34, Rom. vii. 14); it is further the direct opposite of righteousness (1 John iii. 7); and it has a law contrary to the law of the spirit of life (Rom. viii. 2).

These passages are sufficient to show the light in which sin is regarded in the New Testament. It is not a mere transgression, and, as such, deserving of punishment. It is something which no remission of punishment can cure. It is an active principle of evil, of selfishness and rebellion against God in the moral nature, something, therefore, which needs to be destroyed or rendered helpless in itself. There is, in short, a compound conception in the Scriptural thought of sin; and, if it is to be overcome by a message of Divine mercy and an exercise of Divine power, these must meet directly and immediately each of the two factors that make it up.

(2.) The light in which the sacred writers regard the putting away of sin, or in other words the sense in which they understand the *ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν* or *τῶν ἁ.,* or *ἄφεσις παραπτωμάτων.* These important expressions, of which the first occurs frequently in the New Testament, the last only once, while in Heb. x. 22 *ἄφεσις* stands alone, are generally understood to mean "forgiveness of sins" in the sense of removal of guilt, without

thought of the removal or putting away of the sins themselves. It may be doubted if this interpretation is correct. Trench, indeed, in his *Synonyms* (First series, p. 131), defends it; "He then, that is partaker of the ἀφεσις, has his sins forgiven, so that . . . they shall not be imputed to him, or mentioned against him, any more." But it is to be observed that in the section referred to Trench is almost wholly occupied with the distinction between ἀφεσις and πάρεσις, and that he does not even allude to the question whether or not there lies in the first of these words the idea of removing sins themselves, as well as the idea of forgiving them. The meaning of the verb is properly "to send away," and in this sense it is frequently employed (Matt. xiii. 36, 1 Cor. vii. 11, 12, 13), the sense of "leaving" being only secondary. But to send away sins is to do more than to leave or not impute them. It is to cancel sins, so that they shall no longer exist, just as one cancels a debt (Matt. xvii. 27, 32), i.e. so that the debt is completely blotted out. When thus sent away sins are extinguished, are wholly removed from the sight of God so that they cannot be punished. There is thus a clear distinction between ἀφεσις and πάρεσις (Rom. iii. 25), the sins in the latter case, though the guilt of them was not imputed, remaining to rise up, it may be, against the sinner at a future time. In ἀφεσις ἀμαρτιῶν sins are regarded in a deeper light than as only bringing condemnation, the thought of their extinction as offensive in the sight of God and hurtful to the sinner being included. The old sins are completely put away, and the sinner is placed in a position from which he can start upon a new life, free not only from punishment but from the "bondage" which sin as a power had brought with it.

This view of the effect of ἀφεσις is confirmed by the language of St. John in his first Epistle, "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and righteous to forgive us (ἐνα ἀφῆ) our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness" (1 John i. 9). The cleansing (καθαρίζω) here spoken of is undoubtedly a moral cleansing, and that not in the mere sense of leaving us in a negative condition, but in the condition of persons who have had a positive communication made to them of Divine light and life (1 John i. 7, Acts xv. 9, Titus ii. 14, Heb. ix. 14, Eph. v. 26, 27). The "cleansing" referred to is not, however, to be so separated from the previous clause as to constitute a distinct act performed at a moment subsequent to the first. The usage of καί in the writings of the Apostle (comp. John xiv. 1, xv.

26, 27) forbids this. The two things, though they may be distinguished in thought, go together. Both are the one acting to the sons of light of Him who is light. The moral element in the second thus belongs also to the first. In forgiving sin God's sentence is not only judicial but moral: in imparting life it is not only moral but judicial. The sinner who confesses his sins has, through the blood of Christ, separated himself from them, and the Righteous God pronounces His judicial sentence accordingly, bestowing upon him at the same time, through the blood of Christ, His own perfectly holy and, because perfectly holy, therefore also judicially righteous, life (comp. Haupt, *Der Erste Brief des Johannes, in loc.*)

(3.) The light in which "salvation" is presented to us in the New Testament. As a remedy it corresponds to the disease. Two individual texts may first be noticed. (a) "Thou shalt call His name Jesus, for it is He that shall save His people from their sins" (Matt. i. 21). It will hardly be contended that in these words of the angel to Joseph we are to understand by the word "save" either deliverance from the punishment of sin alone, or moral renewal alone. Both are obviously included. The Captain of our salvation, the Joshua, the Jesus of the New Testament, leads His people out of bondage not only as pardoned but as redeemed to their new and higher life. They are delivered from sin itself as well as from its guilt. (b) "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world!" (John i. 29). The word *ἀφεν* here is not (with Luthardt) to be understood as applicable to the removal of guilt alone. The use of the verb in 1 John iii. 5 (comp. the context there) is decisive upon the point. It signifies the removal of sin itself as well as of its punishment. Christ "came to remove all sin even as He was Himself sinless" (Westcott on 1 John iii. 5: comp. Godet on John i. 29). If the comment by Milligan and Moulton on the distinction between the language of ver. 29 and ver. 36 be allowed to have validity this interpretation is confirmed. In ver. 29 the Christian is supposed to be placed in his *full* Christian position; in ver. 36 he is nourished and maintained in it. The "taking away" of sin spoken of by the Baptist is a compound thought; and, if we analyse it, it includes the removal of sin itself as well as its pardon by means of the expiatory sacrifice of the Lamb of God.

It is not possible to dwell further upon individual texts, but

it may be well to quote a few in which clear expression is given to the *immediateness* with which the introduction of men to a new life is bound up with Christ's work on our behalf, in which that work is represented as directly affecting the removal of sin as well as its pardon. Thus St. Paul, instructing Titus as to the things which he was to "speak with all authority," gives prominence to the truth that "our Saviour Jesus Christ gave Himself for us that He might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto Himself a people for His own possession, zealous of good works" (Titus ii. 14, 15). Thus the same Apostle, writing to the Galatians, speaks of "our Lord Jesus Christ who gave Himself for our sins, that He might deliver us out of this present evil world" (Gal. i. 4). Again, he declares to the Ephesians that "Christ loved the Church and gave Himself up for it, that He might sanctify it, having cleansed it by the washing of water with the Word, that He might present the Church to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish" (Ephes. v. 25-27); and, once more, writing to the Romans, he says, "For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and as an offering for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit" (Rom. viii. 3, 4). To the same effect St. John, referring to the removal rather than the pardon of sin, or at least implying in his words the first not less than the second, says in his first Epistle, "If we walk in the light as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus His Son cleanseth us from all sin" (1 John i. 7). St. Peter follows in the same line of thought, "knowing that ye were redeemed . . . from your vain manner of life handed down from your fathers" (1 Pet. i. 18). The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews also shows what he means by the words "take away sins," when he confirms his statement as to the offering of Christ by a passage from the Old Testament in which the moral element predominates, introducing it by the word "wherefore". (Heb. x. 5-7); and when, contrasting that offering with the offering of bulls and goats, he again exclaims, "How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through Eternal Spirit offered Himself without blemish unto God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" (Heb. ix. 14): while in the Apocalypse

the song of praise to the glorified Redeemer with which the book begins is, "To Him that loved us, and loosed" (not "washed") "us from our sins in His blood" (Rev. i. 5). Add to these the whole train of apostolic thought with regard to that ordinance of Baptism by which we are engrafted into Christ, so that we begin to receive the full communications of His grace; and the language of the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans will show us that the very purpose of that Sacrament is not only to signify and seal our pardon but our being buried with Christ through Baptism unto death, that we may walk in newness of life, that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin.

When we look at these passages, and there are many more to the same effect, we are at once struck with the moral and religious aspect in which the atoning work of our Lord is set before us. There is no mention of any change produced on our legal relation towards God. We know, indeed, from other passages that there is such a change at the time when the new life is given. But in the texts now quoted it is not spoken of, and the fact that it is not is a strong warrant for saying that the writers of these texts did not regard the religious life as a *consequence* of our being saved. That life was a part of the salvation. Salvation is again before us as a compound thought.

It is not only, however, to individual texts that reference may be made. The point now under consideration may be illustrated by the tone and spirit of Epistles as a whole. Let us take the Epistle to the Galatians. Does the Apostle deal in this Epistle only with legal relations, with justification considered simply as a forensic act? or does he deal also with the moral and spiritual life of those to whom he addresses words which are "living creatures, with hands and feet"? The use made by Luther of the Galatian Epistle is well known; and the question is not whether the Reformer was right so far as he went, but whether he unfolded the whole meaning of the book on which he was commenting. So far he was right. He found in the Epistle what is really there. But by treating one side of the truth as if it were the whole truth he has in no small degree contributed to diminish the force of an appeal worthy of all the enthusiasm which it stirred within his own breast. For it is a narrow view of this Epistle which leads us to imagine that the law is spoken of in it merely in its relation to the sinner's justification, and not also as it affects the state

in which man is to live before God,—whether in obedience to outward and constraining statutes, or in the free unfolding of a spiritual life from within, when the Spirit of the Lord dwells in the heart, and inspires and regulates the life of faith. The latter of these thoughts penetrates the Epistle as deeply as the former. There was a dispensation of the law; What is its true place in history? It was to be our tutor to lead us to Christ, yet not only that we might be justified by Him alone, but that He, living in us, might unfold and perfect in us that manhood of the Christian life which can be reached in no other way. Now that He has come, and that we are united to Him in faith, we are no longer under the tutor. We are sons who have attained to the privileges of sonship; the Spirit of God is in our hearts; and the fruit of the Spirit is manifest to the spiritually enlightened mind. This is not Antinomianism. Is there no reality, no truth, in the Spirit? Is there no clear decided answer to be obtained from the Spirit—the Spirit, let us remember, who is the Spirit of Christ—when we ask what, as the sons of God who cry, Abba, Father, we are to do? The Apostle says, “Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh;” and again, “If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit.” Was he wrong in thinking that to walk in the Spirit was as definite and intelligible as to walk according to the law? Men do not believe in the reality of the Spirit’s influence. They say, We must have the law to tell us what we ought to do; to speak of the Spirit is vague; every man will have a spirit of his own. But if we “love our neighbour as ourselves,” surely that is not vague, loose, indefinite. St. Paul tells us that “the whole law is fulfilled in that one word” (Gal. v. 14). He evidently connected with the Spirit something quite as distinct and definite as the law. Through all this argument, which it is impossible to follow out in detail, careful consideration will show that St. Paul is not dealing with justification alone, but also with the life of the justified man. This, indeed, may be said to be the keynote of the Epistle, in so far as it is grounded upon the Apostle’s personal experience, “Far be it from me to glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world hath been crucified unto me, and I unto the world” (Gal. vi. 14). Two sides of truth are again united in one.

(4.) A similar combination of particulars, often separated, is to be seen also in the account given us in Scripture of the

manner in which salvation is applied. The words of St. Paul upon this point in Rom. i. 17 are so important that it will be unnecessary to refer to others, "For therein is revealed a righteousness of God by" (or out of) "faith unto faith; as it is written, But the righteous shall live by" (or out of) "faith." No one denies that these words constitute the theme and kernel of the Epistle in which they occur; or that, by the manner in which we understand them, we must understand the reasonings of the Epistle as a whole. What, then, does the "righteousness of God" mean? It is unnecessary to linger on the fact that Protestant Commentators almost invariably maintain that, as used here, it expresses not a Divine attribute but a condition of man. To use the words of Godet (*in loc.*), it is "The relation to God in which a man would naturally be placed by his righteousness, if he were righteous, and which God bestows on him of grace on account of his faith." There are various grounds on which it seems impossible to accept this rendering.

(a) The correct translation of the words demands the indefinite not the definite article before "righteousness." The Apostle speaks of "a righteousness," not of "the righteousness," of God. In other words, he speaks of a righteousness which God might have manifested in some other way. He might, for example, have done it by a revelation of His wrath against sin (comp. ver. 18), but then it would have been something in Himself, not in man. That the way spoken of is one of different ways which God might have adopted "to declare His righteousness" shows that the Apostle could not have been thinking simply of a saving relation of man to God. There is only one way of salvation.

(b) This meaning is inconsistent with the verb "revealed" (*ἀποκαλύπτεται*), which never signifies to bring into existence an entirely new state of things, but only to uncover, to bring into light, what was previously hidden.

(c) The expression used by the Apostle has an abstract form. Let us ask him to make it concrete, and we learn from chap. iii. 25, 26, where, after a digression, the argument has been resumed, that he would at once have answered "Christ,"—"For therein is revealed Christ." He could not have so spoken had he not been thinking of something in God rather than in the relation of man to God; and, accordingly, though nothing can be clearer than that the "His righteousness" of

chap. iii. 25 is precisely the same as the "righteousness of God" in chap. i. 17, Godet is compelled to make them differ, —in chap. iii. 25 "An attribute of God," in chap. i. 17 a relation of man.

(d) The thought of the "power" of the Gospel is what is most present to the Apostle's mind. But the word "power" is more properly applied to that in God by which He makes man righteous than to that by which He declares him righteous.

(e) Throughout the whole passage St. Paul deals not simply with the guilt of man, but with his condition as a creature who, whether Jew or Gentile, leads naturally a sinful life. For this disease the remedy is especially provided; and, although the application is not yet made by the apostle, the thought of the new and higher life in contrast with the old and lower life, is from the first in his mind, and cannot be separated from the statement of those contents of the Gospel by which it is brought about.¹

The words "a righteousness of God" must therefore be understood in their natural and simple sense. As employed by St. Paul, and before we begin to analyse them, or to mark by theological terms the separate parts of the analysis, they mean God's own righteousness, which is offered to us in the Gospel, and is made over to us on the only condition on which such a gift can be received — faith. We can neither separate the "righteousness of God" from God's personal righteousness, nor can we regard man as possessing no personal righteousness when the righteousness of God is made his.

Take one to whom the "righteousness of God" spoken of in Rom. i. 17 has been communicated, and consider what we see. A complex state is presented to us. As one who had sinned, violating the holy law of God and unable to make any atonement for sin, he is yet a child of God in Christ Jesus, and to this aspect of his state the term *justification* is applied. Into it there enters no thought of imparted righteousness. But that is only one aspect of his state. He cannot be in a condition of acceptance with God without having been so united to Christ as to be beheld in Christ, and he cannot be so united to Christ without having been inwardly changed from what he was, and to that aspect of his state the term *sanctification*, at least in

¹ On the whole of this point comp. the admirable discussion by Professor John Forbes in his *Com-*

mentary on the Romans, p. 102, etc.

germ, is applied. But neither the one term nor the other is the same as the term *salvation*. Both must be combined if the whole condition of the person referred to is to be described. Unless this be done our description is imperfect, although each part of it is true so far as it goes. Nor are we entitled to say that the second part followed the first, for at the same moment that the sinner was—by that union with Christ, without which he can receive no spiritual gift—brought into a state of acceptance, he, by the same union, had the beginning of spiritual life infused into him. We are only entitled to separate in thought the one part from the other, because doing so helps to make our conception of the whole process clearer, and because we agreed at the beginning to apply a single term to each single part. But we have carefully to distinguish between salvation on the one hand, and justification and sanctification on the other. Salvation includes both these last.¹

¹ The question may be asked, Whether, if it be so, the preacher of the Gospel is under any circumstances entitled to preach justification by faith alone? The question can only be answered in the affirmative; but why? Not because such a lesson is a complete expression of the truth, but because it may be that aspect of the truth which is peculiarly needed by those whom the preacher is addressing at the time. The preaching of Wesley, Whitefield, the brothers Rowland and Richard Hill and many others bears striking testimony to this. Men are not always alive to their disease, any more than they are always alive to the nature of the remedy, as a whole. There are many whose consciences are shaken and whose hearts are torn by dread of the punishment their sins deserve at the hands of God. To urge upon them the thought of that inward righteousness which they require would only increase their terror and drive them farther from all hope of peace. They are dwelling too exclusively upon one aspect of their disease and, to meet that, they must have enforced upon

them, with more than ordinary earnestness, one aspect of the remedy. Again, there are many not so much overwhelmed by dread of punishment as bowed down under the thought of their own unfitness for anything that is good; and what they require is the assurance that in Christ Jesus there is a Divine strength provided for them by which they may overcome the World.

Both these are special cases. The general duty of the preacher is to bring together into one what the theology of the schools has separated. He is, in short, as a rule to preach Christ, leaving it to his hearers to make the application to themselves of the side of the complex truth which their condition peculiarly needs. *After* men have been brought into the Church's fold, and when it is desirable to lead them on to a more intelligent perception of the grace in which they stand, they may be taught what justification and sanctification mean, and what is the relation between them. There is but small risk then that they will become either antinomian or self-righteous.

In confirmation of what has been said as to the importance of looking at salvation in the synthesis of its parts, it may be worth while to observe that to such an extent is this the habit of the sacred writers that, when they do allude to the parts, they sometimes place them in an order different from that of logical thought. Thus, for example, St. Paul writes to the Corinthians, "But ye were washed, but ye were sanctified, but ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the spirit of our God" (1 Cor. vi. 11), while St. Peter addresses his readers as "Elect . . . in sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ" (1 Pet. i. 2). No one worthy of being listened to will say that either Apostle was illogical, the truth being that they viewed salvation as a whole, and that even after they had separated it into parts they did not think it necessary to ask, in re-combining them, whether they were doing this in a manner perfectly logical, or not.

Failure to observe the distinction for which we have contended, a distinction deeply embedded in Protestant theology, vitiates Newman's otherwise able volume on Justification. When he starts with the idea that that word expresses our whole relation to Christ, he has of course no difficulty in proving that righteousness imparted as well as imputed is necessary to our being justified.

From all that has been said it will be seen that the Apostles proceed upon a double view of the necessities of man. On the one hand, man has sinned: he has rebelled against his righteous King and Governor: and he feels this. "When the commandment comes sin revives" (Rom. vii. 9). A guilty conscience makes him afraid, and he has neither confidence nor hope in the thought of the presence of God, until he sees that there is a way by which he may draw near to Him in *that very character which had impressed itself upon his conscience and awakened his fears*. He cannot rest on any assurance of mere change in God. The voice within had testified that his former conception of God was right. It testifies still to the same truth. He cannot hold at one and the same instant two views of God which are inconsistent with each other, and he must choose between them. But if he chooses that which puts the justice of God into the background, he must, in doing so, acknowledge that his former fears were groundless, and that the religious experience which made him cry after reconciliation

to a holy and just God was false. On the other hand, man has not merely sinned. He goes on sinning; and again he feels it. He knows that within him there is an evil heart which is the root of his most poignant sorrow. Pardon of past offences will not cure that. A spiritual change in himself is requisite. He must have a new life given him in which he will hate the evil that he formerly loved, and love the holiness that he formerly shunned. These two states of man's spiritual consciousness, it is further to be observed, go together. They are simultaneous rather than successive. Neither of them is simply a deduction from the existence of the other. Each rests upon an immediate experience of its own, and both experiences must be satisfied, each in its own way, before the sinner can be at peace.

To these two states of human experience, practically combined in one, though they may be separately viewed, the sacred writers apply the two divisions of the work of Christ, to which reference has been made; and what is demanded of the theologian who would arrange and systematise the revelation of the New Testament upon this point is, that he shall find some conception of the work of Christ on our behalf which shall include what is necessary for both. He was not wrong in dividing. It is the very business of theology to divide that she may command, to separate a complex truth into its parts that she may determine with greater clearness and accuracy the force of each, together with the nature of the tie by which the parts are bound into a whole. Her mistake is apt to lie in carrying back to a Scripture statement, containing the whole truth, only the single side of the truth into which she has been inquiring, and thus narrowing the meaning of the original revelation in a way not contemplated by its Author. Her danger is less that of reading into the New Testament what is not there, than in not reading out of it all that is there. In earnest times, and it is only in such times that theology comes into existence, theology is necessarily one-sided. The mass of men cannot occupy themselves with more than one aspect of the truth at the same instant. They labour at, they determine, they fix that, intending it to apply to the special error against which they contend, and they conquer in the struggle. Another generation takes up the fruits, and is content with them, as if victory had been won over the whole field. The balance of the different parts of the truth is immediately disturbed, and truth

suffers from the want of a comprehensive and uniting grasp of its various portions. In such circumstances the duty of the theologian is to go back to the fountainhead, before the waters parted, one stream in one direction, and another in another; and there to estimate the nature and capabilities of the waters as they issue from their perennial spring. He has not to discover what certain words of Scripture *may* mean in certain circumstances, or what special applications may be made of them. He has to discover the full meaning of the words, or all that was in the mind of their writer at the moment when he employed them.

We are thus brought back to the question, Is there any conception of our Lord's work on our behalf which fulfils this end, which may enable us to feel that, in appropriating that work, we appropriate it as one? It would seem as if such a conception were to be found in the view that our Lord's offering of Himself to the Father is not that of death alone, but of life passing through death. In that thought we have at the same instant both life and death. After the manner of Scripture we combine what the Church has divided.

IV. The view now taken of the offering of Christ is supported by the theology and religious life of the Reformation. These two things ought not to be separated from each other, when we would determine what the religious ideas of the Reformers were. There is even a probability that in a time of excited controversy men will express only half their mind. A great error is before their eyes, and so intent are they on its defeat that they can think of nothing else. They do not know all that is working silently in their own minds, and contributing to make them what they are. But what is thus unappreciated may not be the less real, and those who would afterwards judge them rightly must take it into account.¹

Looked at in this light, it may perhaps be said that there were two theologies of the Reformation. There was the theology of the controversy with Rome, of polemical tracts, of hooks, of creeds, of intellectual statements. But there was also the theology of the hearts of those by whom that controversy was carried on, as the fire of Divine life burned within them in zeal for God's glory and the good of man. But the heroes of

¹ "Our futile and mistaken understanding of truth does not hinder our being indirectly and unconsciously benefited by it." *The Gospel of Divine Humanity*, 2d edition, p. 160.

the Reformation did not think of the latter. It was too real, too true, too much the very condition of their life and action to be thought of. It was *themselves*; and the existence of themselves had to be taken for granted in what they did. They thought therefore mainly, perhaps only, of the former; and the theology which they handed down to subsequent generations, highly valuable as it was *in its own place and for its own work*, became narrow and one-sided when those who followed them took it for the whole. A true Systematic Theology must always be the living expression of the age in which it appears. The Reformers wrote only half of what they were; they lived the other half without knowing and reading, and consequently without writing it. The effect appears to have been that the Church of later times, in devotion to what the Reformers taught, has not sufficiently considered what they would have taught had they foreseen that their teaching was to be the norm for times less earnest and for hearts less glowing than their own. She has too often dealt with Christianity as if its essence were a thing of legal forms, and as if its demands were a deduction from certain legal observances. In this respect she seems to need reviving; and one of the first great truths to produce such a revival may be said to be, that the Offering to God on the part of the Lord who is the Head of the Body was not completed on the cross, but was, after the cross, and is, even now, made by Him who is our Living High-priest in heaven.

We cannot, however, hold this without at the same time holding that the essence of our Lord's offering consists in the fact that it was an offering of life, and, because life, therefore in its own nature perpetual. Regard it as an act in which life is only given up in death, and it is difficult to see how the perpetuity of the offering can be distinguished from that repetition of it which Scripture condemns. Thus an able writer, justly defending the idea of perpetuity, has lately said that the argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews "yields this result: Christ the High Priest with the blood of His sacrifice is entered into the Holy of Holies, i.e. heaven itself. He is there at this moment making atonement, and we, His Congregation, are waiting without. We are waiting till He comes forth, which will be at the Second Advent. Till that time the atonement goes on" (*Church Quarterly Review*, April 1891, p. 18). But that is not the teaching of the Epistle; for no lesson is more distinctly impressed upon it than that the whole Congregation

have even now "boldness to enter into the holy place" (*i.e.* the Holy of Holies) "in the blood of Jesus" (Heb. x. 19); that they are even now come unto "Mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, . . . and to Jesus the Mediator of a new covenant, and to the blood of sprinkling that speaketh better than Abel" (Heb. xii. 22-24). They are not "without." That was the case with the Israelitish (Luke i. 10), it is not the case with the Christian Church. Yet if, in thinking of the Offering of our Lord, we view it simply as an act, an act of death, it is not easy to escape one of two conclusions—either, that as an offering it is still incomplete, or that it is, as yet at least, constantly repeated in heaven, and that it ought therefore to be constantly repeated on earth in the service of the Mass. On the other hand, let us look upon our Lord's offering as an offering of His life, and the difficulty disappears. In the very nature of the case it is then complete, but it goes continually forward. In it also we are "complete,"¹ and by it we approach with boldness to the throne of God as a throne of grace, "that we may receive mercy, and may find grace to help us in time of need."² Nay, not only so. We may then adopt the ancient idea that the words "for ever" stretch even beyond the Second Advent; and we may believe that in Christ's offering for ever His people for ever stand.³

¹ Col. ii. 10.

² Heb. iv. 16.

³ The difficulties besetting any one who, upon the ordinary view that the death of Christ is merely a satisfaction to Divine justice, would attempt to explain how that bodily death upon the cross becomes, in St. Paul's reasoning upon the subject, identical with the dying of the "old man" in Christians, are well illustrated by Pfeleiderer's effort to trace the genesis of Pauline thought upon the subject. His explanation, as given in his *Paulinism* (vol. i. chap. 2, translation by Peters), depends mainly on the assertion that, between the writing of 2 Cor. and Romans, there was on the Apostle's part an "advance" in "the formalisation, and at the same time the externalisation, of a fact of religious experience which is

in itself purely inward and of psychological origin" (p. 112). In so speaking, Pfeleiderer refers to the grateful devotion awakened in the believer by the thought of Christ's dying for him, and he supposes that the believer is led by this into the further thought of a mystical union with Christ, in which the death of Christ, already accomplished in him as a spiritual fact, "comes to be represented as a fact accomplished externally and to the senses in that very death of Christ." The explanation thus given can hardly be called simple or clear; but, apart from that, it is inconsistent with St. Paul's teaching as to the *unio mystica*. According to the Apostle this union with Christ is rather the offspring of a faith in, and a love to Him in, His Divine-human personality. It rather pre-

The conclusion to which we are led by a consideration of the whole matter is that the older theology, which deals with the ideas of sacrifice, of vicarious suffering, and of penal consequences to our Lord, is substantially true. It needs only that the element of life shall be allowed its proper place in the conception of sacrifice, and shall be made an integral part of the Atonement made on our behalf, and not a merely logical consequence deduced from it. The effort to introduce this thought probably lies at the bottom of those theories of the Atonement, differing from that generally held in the Church, which exercise more or less influence in our day. With the spirit leading to such efforts it is impossible not to sympathise. The Church has had bitter enough experience of the evil effects of that system of legal theology which has so long held possession of the field. She has seen a wide gulf opened between a supposed salvation in Christ and life in Him. She has seen a so-called orthodoxy, cold and hard, reigning in her pulpits and her pews, until at last many of the occupants of both, unable to endure their dissatisfaction longer, and having no better substitute, have been constrained to abandon theology, if not also Christianity, altogether. She has seen words expressive of the most solemn realities of the eternal world played with as if they were a set of counters without meaning. She has seen a preaching, boasting itself to be that of the only Gospel, so separated from

cedes than follows the thought of Christ's giving Himself for us, and only at a later stage is it connected with a process of analysing what is meant either by Christ's dying for us or our dying with Him.

In his most recent work (*Ur-Christenthum*, p. 211, etc.) Pfleiderer returns to the subject; and, forced to attempt an explanation of the fact that St. Paul should have thought of God as One to whom the bloody sacrifice of Christ was necessary before He could save men, while He was yet at the same time a God of love, he declares the contrariety (*Gegensatz*) to be logically insoluble, and only psychologically soluble when we remember that two souls dwelt in the Apostle. One of these, springing out of his Judaism and Pharisaism,

led him to think of God as a God of avenging justice. The other, springing out of his Christian consciousness, led him to see in God a God of compassion and love. It must be obvious that this is no solution of the difficulty. It simply removes the difficulty a step farther back. But, not to dwell upon this, it is rather to be observed that all these laborious speculations are unnecessary, if we realise the fact that it is not the extinction of Christ's physical life that is our atonement, but rather His life thus surrendered in death, so that in the act of becoming partakers of His death for us we become also partakers of His life in us. The two contrarieties cease thus to be contrarieties, and coalesce in one truth with a double bearing upon men.

sweetness of moral tone and beauty of moral conduct that the faith of weak Christians has trembled in the balance, while a merely outward formalism has passed gaily through the Church and the world, smiling at its own accomplishments. All this the Church has seen, until it may be doubted whether her life, looked at on a large scale, has not become an obstacle to the progress of Christianity, instead of being, as it ought to be, the most powerful argument in its favour. No wonder that so many of her best children have sighed and cried for life, and that in the effort to reach it they have often been led to give utterance to views supported by neither Scripture nor experience.

We need, therefore, at this moment a restatement of the great doctrine of the Offering of our Lord for sinners; and, although that proposed in these pages may be rejected as untenable, any one that shall be more fortunate in obtaining the acceptance of the Church will probably find it necessary to have regard to its leading principle. In one way or another life will have to be included in the essence of the sacrifice made on our behalf. The conscience will never be satisfied while life is viewed simply as a consequence deduced from a change in our legal relation towards God.¹

¹ That the Church is feeling her way towards some such view of the doctrine of the Atonement as would follow from the principles here laid down seems to find an illustration in words that may be quoted from a sermon recently preached in Aberdeen by the Rev. Robert A. Mitchell, one of the ministers of the Free Church of Scotland there. The sermon was preached before the Free Church Synod, and was published at the *Synod's request*. The text was Rom. viii. 3, 4. The whole sermon is interesting and able, and one or two sentences may be quoted. "Why not read the passage before us, then, in the light of that previous passage (Rom. vi. 2), and regard it as meaning this, that the condemnation which rested upon us on account of our sin, by bringing about the death of the Son of God made for our sakes in the likeness of sinful flesh, has inflicted

a death-blow upon the sin rooted in our flesh, and so has secured our deliverance from the ruling power of sin?" (p. 13). Again, referring to Rom. vi. 10, the writer explains our dying unto sin, as "a sharing with Christ in His dying, by being conformed to the likeness of His death, by entering, so to speak, into the *spirit* of His death. And His death is *nothing* to us, and can avail us nothing, unless we do so. . . . In the view of Paul it is one of the Christian's greatest privileges that he is *dead with Christ* (not merely legally but morally); he has died to sin by taking on the likeness of His death, by entering into the fellowship of that *death to sin* which the incarnate Son of God, the second Adam, the true Son of Man, consummated once for all in the agony of the cross" (pp. 19, 20. The italics are the author's). The difference from the common way of

NOTE C, p. 203.

A striking illustration of what is said in the text is afforded by words of Laurence Oliphant, quoted by Mrs. Oliphant in her beautiful biography of that noble and pure soul. In a letter, explanatory of his faith, to her who was to be his future biographer, Oliphant says: "The breath of Christ descending into the organisms of men to meet the invading force from below, makes known its presence also by *physical* sensations of a blessed and life-giving character, conveying with irresistible force the consciousness that Christ is actually descending with power and great glory a second time to dwell with us." Again, in a letter to another friend, he speaks of himself and those who agree with him as enjoying "evidences both of an *external* and *internal* character, which the world would call supernatural, encouraging us when we are obeying His will," etc. And, once more, he thus describes our Lord: "He is the connecting link between us and the great Unknowable, and for this cause He came into the world, that He might unite us *sensationally* to His Father and our Father" (vol. ii. pp. 18, 34, 335. The italics are not in the original). To the many supposed experiences of this kind in the so-called Revival Movements of the day it is not necessary to refer.

stating the truths involved in this momentous subject which appears in these extracts can hardly fail to be recognised. Dr. Macleod Campbell's work on the Atonement,

even when the theory contained in it is not adopted, has exercised a powerful influence over modern thought.