

VIII.

COLLATERAL QUESTIONS.

BEFORE leaving the subject of the human *πνεῦμα* and its correlation with *ψυχή*, it may be well to glance at the Apostle's use of two other terms of frequent occurrence that partake of a psychological character, as denoting, in whole or in part, the inner man—*καρδία* and *νοῦς*. A brief examination of the facts regarding them will at once enable us to complete our view of the several aspects in which St. Paul conceived the mind and its action, and show how far he moulded his language on, and how far he advanced beyond, Old Testament precedent.

The word *καρδία* is employed by him fifty-two times, in one or two instances as part of a quotation, but in most cases as his spontaneous choice; and it is, in point of fact, of more frequent occurrence than either *ψυχή* or *πνεῦμα* (in the psychological sense). Its position in the cycle of the Apostle's thoughts is, relatively speaking, clear and definite. It is never used, like *ψυχή*, of the subject to whom the individual life belongs, in such a

sense as to be interchanged with the personal pronoun; nor is it employed, like *πνεῦμα*, to denote the principle of that life as divinely given. It signifies throughout the *central seat and organ* of the personal life of man regarded in and by himself. Hence it is almost constantly accompanied by the genitive of the possessive pronouns *μου, σου, αὐτοῦ, ἡμῶν, ὑμῶν* (*ἐμῆς* in Rom. x. 1: *εὐδοκία τῆς ἐμῆς καρδίας*).

The term is adopted and applied after the analogy of the Hebrew *lebh*, the meaning of which is, as we have seen, more comprehensive than in our modern use of "heart." The latter word indeed serves perfectly to bring out the hidden, inner, central nature of the seat of life; but, as we use it, it denotes predominantly, if not exclusively, the emotional side of that life. It is for us the seat and organ of feeling rather than of intelligence or of counsel. When we speak of thoughts, ideas, or purposes in reference to a local centre, we refer them to the head or to the brain rather than to the heart. If we use the latter term, therefore, as we cannot but continue to do, as the rendering of *lebh* or *καρδία*, we must carefully dissociate it from the restricted import of its ordinary use, and treat it as like the Homeric *κραδίη, κῆρ*, or *φρένες*, the inner organ to which all the functions of the mind are referred—the seat of all mental action, feeling,

thinking, willing.¹ There are a few passages, no doubt, where it points mainly to the seat of the feelings and emotions, such as 2 Cor. ii. 4: "anguish of heart"; Rom. ix. 2: "pain in my heart"; Rom. x. 1: "my heart's desire" [literally good pleasure, *εὐδοκία*]; 2 Cor. vi. 11: "our heart is enlarged"; Phil. i. 7: "I have you in my heart" [or "ye have me in your heart"]; but even in these cases the special does not exclude the more general sense that would be best expressed by our word "mind," if it had carried along with it anything of a local reference.

In the great majority of passages, it is absolutely necessary to give to the term the wider meaning, which is obviously implied in the cardinal counsel of Prov. iv. 23: "Keep thy heart with all diligence [literally: above all that is kept—*prae omni re custodienda*], for out of it are the issues [or sources] of life." It is not merely the receptacle of impressions and the seat of emotion, but the labora-

¹ This comprehensive sense of the term is well illustrated by Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 9: "Aliis cor ipsum animus videtur, ex quo *excordes, vecordes, concordesque* dicuntur, et Nasica ille prudens, bis consul, *Corculum* ["*corculum a corde dicebant antiqui sollertem et acutum,*" Festus] et

Egregie cordatus homo, Catus Aelius Sextus"—

a verse of Ennius, which Cicero is fond of quoting. And the same thought is pithily expressed by Lactantius (*De Opif. Dei*, 10): "Cor domicilium sapientiae."

tory of thought and the fountainhead of purpose. Sometimes it appears as pre-eminently the organ of intelligence, as at Rom. i. 21 : " their foolish (*ἀσύνετος*) heart was darkened " ; 2 Cor. iii. 15 : " a veil lieth upon their heart " ; 2 Cor. iv. 6 : " God . . . shined in our hearts " ; Eph. i. 18 : " having the eyes of your heart enlightened " [*τῆς καρδίας* instead of *διανοίας*] ; sometimes as the seat of moral choice and volition, 1 Cor. vii. 37 : *ἑδραῖος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ . . . κεκρίκεν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ* ; 2 Cor. ix. 7 : " according as he hath purposed in his heart " ; Rom. ii. 5 : " impenitent heart." Actions spring out of, and take their character from, the *καρδία*, as in Rom. vi. 17 : " ye obeyed from the heart " ; 1 Tim. i. 5 : " love out of a pure heart " ; 2 Tim. ii. 22 ; Eph. vi. 5 and Col. iii. 24 : " in singleness of heart." It is in the heart that the work of the law is written (Rom. ii. 15) ; and it is on hearts of flesh and not on tablets of stone that the Corinthian Church is inscribed as an epistle of Christ (2 Cor. iii. 2, and 3, where the best text runs, *οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶν λιθίναις, ἀλλ' ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίαις*, " not in tablets of stone, but in tablets *that are* hearts of flesh " ; but Drs. Westcott and Hort suggest that as " the apposition is harsh and strange, it is not unlikely that the repetition of *πλαξὶν* was a clerical error suggested by the line above").

The *καρδία* in this sense is accordingly set forth

with special frequency as the recipient of the divine *πνεῦμα*, as at Gal. iv. 6 : “ God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts ” ; Rom. v. 5 : “ the love of God hath been shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which was given unto us ” ; 2 Cor. i. 22 : “ God who . . . gave us the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts.” It is the sphere of the Spirit’s various operations and influences, so as to be thereby comforted (2 Thess. ii. 17, Eph. vi. 22, Col. ii. 22), stablished (1 Thess. iii. 13, 2 Thess. ii. 17), directed (*κατευθύναι*, 2 Thess. iii. 5), guarded (Phil. iv. 7). It is the seat of faith (Rom. x. 9 : “ if thou shalt believe in thine heart ”), and the inward organ of spiritual praise (Eph. v. 19 : “ singing and making melody [*ψάλλοντες*] with your heart to the Lord ” ; so too at Col. iii. 17). At Eph. iii. 16, 17 the Apostle presents it as the special object of his prayer for the Church that God would grant “ that ye may be strengthened with power through his Spirit in [*εἰς*=with reference to] the inward man, that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith.” Here the *καρδία* is clearly indicated by the parallelism of the clauses as equivalent to the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*. “ Its characteristic mark is,” as Wendt observes, “ its being *hidden*, secret (Rom. ii. 28, 29, where the *περιτομή καρδίας ἐν πνεύματι* is contrasted with *ἡ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἐν σαρκὶ περιτομή*, 1 Cor. xiv. 25 : ‘ the secrets of his

heart are made manifest').¹ The knowledge of the *καρδία* is a special attribute of God (Rom. viii. 27 ; comp. 1 Thess. ii. 4) ; and the manifestation of its secret counsels forms a main feature of the future judgment (1 Cor. iv. 5 : 'the Lord will both bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and make manifest the counsels of the hearts'). In contrast to the *καρδία*, therefore, we find not the body generally, but sometimes the *face* (*πρόσωπον*, 1 Thess. ii. 17 : 'in presence [face], not in heart' ; 2 Cor. v. 12 : 'that ye may have wherewith to answer them that glory in appearance [*ἐν προσώπῳ* = external aspect] and not in heart') ; sometimes the *mouth* (Rom. x. 8 ff. : 'If thou shalt confess with thy mouth . . . and shalt believe in thy heart'), because these are the organs for the expression of what is within." Here too it is evident that the Apostle proceeds on the lines of traditional usage, and employs the term "heart" in all the compass of its Old Testament significance as embracing the whole region of man's inner life, and especially the domain of conscious thought and purpose.

But, while St. Paul stands thus far, in his use of *σάρξ*, *πνεῦμα*, and *καρδία*, on Old Testament ground,

¹ So, he adds, the Hebrew speaks poetically of "the heart" of the sea, to designate the deepest recesses (Ex. xv. 8 ; Ps. xlv. 3 : "though the mountains be carried into the midst [lit. heart] of the sea").

it is not so with the remaining term which plays a part, though a less prominent one, in his psychological vocabulary—the *νοῦς*. Here he has recourse to a word not unknown indeed to the Septuagint, but for a definite use of which it afforded but little precedent; and he turns it to peculiar and fruitful account, as yielding for him a special significance which those other terms were, in virtue of their very generality and comprehensiveness, less fitted to convey. They designate, as we have seen, the inner life regarded on different sides or aspects, but they deal with it as a whole rather than single out any faculty or function. The *καρδία* doubtless embraced in a general way the functions of reflective intelligence, and moral judgment; but, when the Apostle desired to bring these into particular relief, he chose a word more restricted in its original compass and in its popular use, and stamped upon it an impress of his own. The *καρδία* is the more general, the *νοῦς* the more special term.

“We have no reason,” as Wendt well puts the case, “to separate in analysis the two conceptions, so that the *καρδία* might not as such exercise also the functions which are elsewhere ascribed to the *νοῦς*; we may rather see in the *νοῦς* simply the specialising of an individual faculty of the *καρδία*—a faculty which might even be placed as an independent factor alongside of it. Such a

specialising naturally arises in the *usus loquendi*, when psychological observation has gradually become finer, and when the more general expressions of popular speech no longer correspond to the author's need for a more precise embodiment of his thoughts. Then a special conception detaches itself from the more general one, without its being necessary for the latter to be curtailed in its general significance. There was such a need in the case of St. Paul, and this explains the fact that, while the use of the word *νοῦς* itself is not in the New Testament absolutely confined to him (for it occurs at Luke xxiv. 45, Rev. xiii. 18, and xvii. 9), its frequent and pregnant employment is distinctively characteristic of him. The Apostle had learned from the psychological experience and self-observation which he so strikingly describes in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, that there exists in the human mind an organ, the significance of which consists in the fact that it can make itself independent of the general mental bias of man, but the weakness of which lies in the fact that on account of this very independence it cannot exercise any effective influence over that bias. This faculty is the *νοῦς*, namely, the power of discursive judgment."

The word occurs in the Septuagint some six times as the rendering of *lebh* or *lebhabh*, "heart," and once as a rendering of *ruach* in the passage

Is. xl. 13, which is quoted or alluded to by St. Paul at Rom. xi. 34 and 1 Cor. ii. 16 : *τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν Κυρίου*. Here it is applied, after human analogy, to the divine understanding or the thoughts and counsels thence issuing; and it is doubtless in accordance with this general, rather than in his own more specific, sense that St. Paul employs it in the words which he personally subjoins to the passage of Isaiah he had quoted (1 Cor. ii. 16) : *ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν*. The key to its distinctive Pauline use is found in the express contrast in which the Apostle presents it at 1 Cor. xiv. There, in discussing the subject of spiritual gifts as exhibited in the meetings of the Church, he indicates repeatedly his preference for the *προφητεύειν* over the *γλώσσαις* or *γλώσση λαλεῖν*; and he assigns as a reason for the preference that, while the latter is intelligible only to the speaker, and cannot without being interpreted conduce to the common edification, the former is intelligible to other members of the Church and may edify, comfort, or console them. At verse 19 the Apostle declares that, notwithstanding his grateful consciousness of excelling all in the measure of his glossolalic powers, he would "rather speak five words with his understanding (*τῷ νοῦ μοῦ*), that he might instruct others, than ten thousand words in a tongue." And what he means by *λαλεῖν τῷ νοῦ* is made clearer by the contrast which he had just

drawn at verse 14 between τὸ πνεῦμα μου and ὁ νοῦς μου: "Wherefore let him that speaketh in a tongue pray that he may interpret. For if I pray in a tongue, τὸ πνεῦμα μου προσεύχεται, ὁ δὲ νοῦς μου ἄκαρπός ἐστι. What is it then? I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the understanding also; I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the understanding also."

To find the distinctive sense here pertaining to νοῦς, it does not seem very material to determine the question what is the precise import of the πνεῦμα; whether it is to be taken—with various expositors following Chrysostom's interpretation ("the spiritual gift given to me and moving the tongue,")—of the Spirit of God as having laid hold of the man and moving him to utterance, or of the human spirit which becomes the recipient of the divine influence. In accordance with what we have already said as to the use of πνεῦμα with the genitive of the personal pronoun, the latter would appear the more probable. In that case there is distinguished from the spirit in man that is filled and moved by the Spirit of God in the *glossolalia*, and that yields itself immediately to the divine impulse, a power or faculty called νοῦς, the active participation of which the Apostle desires and commends. This is commonly and rightly held to denote the faculty of reflective intelligence, which apprehends, works upon, and re-

produces in its own forms the contents given to it, and is thereby enabled to make others similarly constituted partakers of its acquisitions. Lüdemann and Pfeiderer restrict its meaning unduly to the formal sense of "consciousness," or "self-consciousness." The former says (p. 63): "Whatever may be our view of the nature and mode of working of the *πνεῦμα* here mentioned, this much appears certain, that the *λαλῶν γλώσση* has not a clear consciousness of what he says. In his case, as the Apostle says, the *νοῦς* is *ἄκαρπος*; by which St. Paul merely indicates that the *λαλῶν γλώσση* does not give his words as the expression of a conviction gained in the way of self-acting consciousness." But what Dr. Lüdemann is sure of has hardly seemed to others equally certain. There is nothing to intimate such an absence of consciousness on the part of the speaker, which, on the contrary, seems hardly consistent with the Apostle's distinct assertion in verse 4: "He that speaketh in a tongue edifieth himself," for "edification,"—building up in the Christian life—cannot well, in keeping with the tenor of the Apostle's teaching elsewhere, be conceived as in progress apart from consciousness.

Wendt, moreover, has well pointed out that "the two conceptions 'to speak without consciousness,' and 'to speak intelligibly for others,' do not form an exact antithesis. One may speak with the fullest

consciousness on his own part, and yet not be intelligible to others on account of a defective *mode of expression*; and, on the other hand, something that is spoken unconsciously may quite well be intelligible to others." And in substantial agreement with the view of Meyer, who renders: "my understanding furnishes nothing, contributes nothing to edify the Church," and interprets the *voûs* of the discursive reflecting faculty, he adds: "The peculiarity of the *glossolalia*, which caused it to lack value for the common worship of the Church, is rather to be conceived as consisting in its being the expression of a merely *intuitive* conception, of an internal perception *in feeling* (*einer gefühlsmässigen Anschauung*), and not proceeding in the forms of discursive thought. The speaker himself must have been well aware of what took place, as it formed the object of his feeling and his internal perception; but it could not be understood by others so long as that intuition was not interpreted by the speaker, or others, in the forms of discursive thought (verses 26 ff.). The *προφητεύειν*, on the other hand, is the expression of a conception already apprehended in itself by means of the discursive faculty of judgment, and for that reason needed no special interpretation for others. And this view that the discussion turns not on the distinction between unconscious and conscious speaking, but on the distinction between what is presented

in non-analysed intuition and what is apprehended successively in individual concepts and judgments, is confirmed by the example of the pipe and harp (verse 7 ff.), in which St. Paul brings out that it depends on the *διαστολή*—that is, on the separation of the individual sounds, in contradistinction to their blending and crossing—whether a clear melody shall be heard.”

The special character of *νοῦς* as the faculty of judgment appears at 1 Cor. i. 10 in its association with *γνωμὴ* as the opinion resulting from its exercise: *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῖ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ*, and at 2 Thess. ii. 2: “that ye be not quickly shaken from your mind (*νοός*),” where the construction seems to be pregnant and the *νοῦς* to denote the mental attitude of sober considerate judgment. So too at Rom. xiv. 5, immediately after the statement that “one man judgeth (*κρίνει*) one day above another, another judgeth every day *alike*,” it is added with reference to the mind exercising this judgment: “let each man be fully assured in his own mind” (*ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ νοῖ*).

As might naturally be expected, its field of exercise with St. Paul is especially ethical; its functions bear pre-eminently on the moral side of life, on the judgment of action. In the seventh chapter of the *Epistle to the Romans*, to which we shall presently recur, the Apostle affirms at once its theoretical position, and its practical incapacity to effect the change *from*

the servitude of sin to the service of the law of God. And at Rom. xii. 2 he sets forth a renewal of the *νοῦς* as the means of that transformation on the part of his readers which he urges, and the necessary preliminary to a correct judgment of right action: "and be not fashioned according to this age, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind (*τῆ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν*), that ye may prove (*δοκιμάζειν*, *i.e.*, in the exercise of moral judgment ascertain) what is the good and acceptable and perfect will of God." "The peculiar activity of the *νοῦς* in this reference," Wendt remarks, "is the *δοκιμάζειν*, that is, the exercise of judgment as to duty, as to how, in the special position of one's calling the individual conduct is to be brought into its due place under (*zu subsumiren ist*) the general rule of the moral law in relation to the kingdom of God. The *νοῦς*, which does not correctly exercise this judgment, so that action takes an unbecoming course, is a *νοῦς ἀδόκιμος* (Rom. i. 28), comp. 2 Tim. iii. 8 : *κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν, ἀδόκιμοι περὶ τὴν πίστιν*, and Tit. i. 15, where the *νοῦς* is associated with the conscience, and it is said of the unbelieving that "both their mind and their conscience are defiled."

At Eph. iv. 17, the Gentiles are described as walking in the vanity of their mind (*ματαιότητι τοῦ νοῦς αὐτῶν*), the import of which is explained by the addition "being darkened in their understanding"

(τῇ διανοίᾳ, where the preposition serves to bring out the element of reflection—of subjection to *thorough handling* in thought); and on the other hand it is set forth as part of the "having learned Christ" that the readers "be renewed in the spirit of their mind"—an expression without any precise parallel, which it would seem most in keeping with the analogy of St. Paul's teaching elsewhere to understand not directly of the divine agent of the renewal—for the Spirit is not elsewhere spoken of as belonging to man as subject—nor yet of a special inner sphere of the human mind that is the seat of the renewal—for there is no warrant elsewhere for the distinction thus sought to be established—but simply as a dative of reference, defining more precisely the nature and character of the renewal as furnishing a new motive power: "as regards the spirit—the principle of new power and life—by which the νοῦς is thenceforth possessed and governed."¹ The point, the essence, of the change lies in the new divinely-given influence under which the νοῦς thinks and acts, and which empowers it to effective action.

This relation of the πνεῦμα as efficient power in the Christian, standing in contrast to the νοῦς as the faculty of moral judgment theoretically active but practically impotent in the natural man under the

¹ See note as to the interpretation of this difficult passage in the Appendix.

discipline of positive law, is most strikingly exhibited in the two remarkable chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, where the Apostle first presents us—in the seventh chapter—with the typical picture of his own experience as illustrating the state of men under the light of the law but not yet enfranchised by grace, and then passes on—in the eighth chapter—to describe the contrasted experience of those who are redeemed in Christ and are led by His Spirit. The question, long and keenly debated, whether in vii. 14-25 the Apostle is to be held as speaking from the standpoint of the regenerate or of the unregenerate man, may now be regarded as determined by the almost unanimous judgment of modern expositors, based on adequate exegetical grounds. Hardly any recent exegete of mark, except Philippi and Delitzsch, lends countenance to the view—to which Augustine was eventually led to resort in opposition to Pelagianism, and which was supported by the chief Reformers following in his wake, and by many subsequent theologians—that St. Paul is depicting the experiences of the believer under grace in conflict with sin. The great body of modern expositors who have had occasion to deal with the question—including Neander, Julius Müller, Nitzsch, Tholuck, Hahn, van Hengel, Ewald, Schmid, Gess, Ernesti, Messner, Baur, Mangold, Lechler, Meyer, Kahnis, Weiss, Godet—have held—although with minor

shades of difference as respects the personal or typical, real or ideal, character of the picture—that it relates to the earlier not yet regenerate state.

It is not necessary for our present purpose that we should enter into the detailed exposition of the passage, or even into the grounds on which the question of its reference has been so generally decided of late in a sense different from the view of the Reformers.¹ It is enough that we take note of the striking contrast in the use of terms presented by the seventh and eighth chapters. In the former, from the point at which St. Paul enters on the

¹ These will be found well put in brief compass by Immer, *Neutest. Theologie*, p. 278 f., and stated with care by Meyer (in his *Commentary*, Eng. translation, vol. II. p. 1-5, 16 ff.; Meyer-Weiss, *Komm.*, p. 335 ff.), and by Godet (*Commentaire*, tome II, pp. 92-95, 115-118, and 142-146), who states that he cannot put his own conclusion into better shape than in the words of M. Bonnet (*Comment.* p. 85): "The Apostle does not speak here either of the *natural man* in his state of ignorance and of voluntary sin, or of the *child of God*, born anew, emancipated by grace, and animated by the Spirit of Christ, but of the man, whose conscience, awakened by the law, has entered with sincerity, with fear and trembling, but still *with his own proper powers*, upon the desperate struggle of opposition to sin (*contre le mal*)," simply adding that "in our present (*actuelles*) circumstances the law which thus awakens the conscience and calls it to the struggle with sin, is the law under the form of the Gospel and of the example of Jesus Christ, taken apart from (*isolément de*) justification in Him and sanctification by Him." Dr. Laidlaw (*Bible Doctrine of Man*, p. 201 ff.) has an interesting discussion of the subject, as to which he holds that "that there are almost equal difficulties

new question raised at verse 7, there is no mention of, or reference whatever to, the *πνεῦμα* which is distinctive of the Christian, and which as such forms the theme whereon he delights to dwell from the very outset of the eighth chapter, proclaiming in the second verse the great characteristic privilege of his state "in Christ Jesus": "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free"—in joyful contradistinction to the previous cry of despair, at vii. 24, "Who shall deliver me?"—"from the law of sin and death." While in the Christian subject, as depicted in chapter viii., the *πνεῦμα*

in affirming the experience described to be that either of a wholly unregenerate or of a fully regenerate man," and recognises "such mixed elements in both delineations [chapters vii. and viii.] that no application of them to distinct stages in conversion and spiritual life is quite satisfactory." His own solution is that the Apostle is presenting two ideal conceptions of the relations to law and grace respectively of a man in Christ aiming at the attainment of holiness. In the first, given in chapter vii., he looks simply at himself and the law." But, with every allowance for the "ideal" conception, and for Dr. Laidlaw's distinction that the Apostle is not merely "describing an experience, but is conducting an argument," his suggestion of a man *in Christ* looking simply at himself and the law seems liable to the remark made by Godet on Dr. Hodge's idea that the Apostle is speaking of a believer under the point of view of his relation to the law apart from his faith (*abstraction faite de sa foi*): "*Mais un croyant, abstraction faite de sa foi . . . cela ressemble bien à un non-croyant.*" How can a man in Christ lay aside his faith? or why should he be supposed to do so?

stands forth in triumphant antithesis to the *σάρξ*, in the special discussion of chapter vii. St. Paul employs only terms pertaining to the natural faculties of the human mind, and especially places in the foreground the *νοῦς*. It is impossible to doubt that the distinction is made designedly; and that those who choose to overlook it, or to explain it away, thereby deprive themselves of the main key to the understanding of the Apostle's utterances. Well might Dr. Baur comment on the amount of unnecessary discussion which people might here have spared themselves, if they had but attended to the distinction between *νοῦς* and *πνεῦμα*!

The *νοῦς* throughout this chapter is the faculty of moral judgment, which perceives and approves what is good, but has not the power of practically controlling the life in conformity to its theoretical requirements; and the use of the term here is quite in keeping with its employment by the Apostlé elsewhere. Wendt well disposes of an objection to this view based on the ascription in Rom. vii. 15 ff. of a "willing" (*θέλειν*) to the *νοῦς*. "It would seem indeed," he says, "from this passage as if the work of the *νοῦς* went beyond this mere judging; for there can be no doubt that the *θέλειν*, which at this passage is set overagainst the *κατεργάζεσθαι* or *πράσσειν*, is an action of the *νοῦς* mentioned in verse 23 ff., which in the state standing in need of

redemption has already before Christian regeneration turned itself away from sin. But here I am disposed to agree with the view of Holsten (p. 383) that the θέλειν in the νοῦς signifies merely the intention, the direction of the mind towards willing (*nur die Absicht, den auf das Wollen gerichteten Sinn*), that the νοῦς denotes the practical conduct only in so far as 'every willing is preceded by a knowing, by the conception of willing.' The verb θέλειν in all Pauline passages signifies not the willing of *resolve*, but the willing of *wish* (Rom. i. 13; ix. 16, 18; xi. 25; 1 Cor. iv. 19; x. 1; xii. 1; 2 Cor. i. 8; v. 4; xii. 20; Col. ii. 18; 1 Thess. iv. 13; 1 Tim. ii. 4). A question could only arise as to the few passages, where with the θέλειν, just as in Rom. vii., there is contrasted a κατεργάζεσθαι, ἐνεργεῖν, or ποιεῖν (1 Cor. vii. 36; 2 Cor. viii. 10 f.; Gal. v. 17; Phil. ii. 13). But in these cases we have to seek for the willing of *resolve* throughout on the side of the ἐνεργεῖν or κατεργάζεσθαι, while θέλειν merely signifies the "thinking it good" (*für gut Halten*), to which the resolve, and thereupon the action, may correspond or run counter. In interpreting these passages we allow ourselves to be too easily influenced by the familiar translation of Luther 'Wollen und Vollbringen' [willing and accomplishing]; but the words κατεργάζεσθαι and ἐνεργεῖν signify not properly to 'accomplish,' but

rather to 'operate' (*bewirken*), or 'be operating', (*κατεργάζεσθαι*: Rom. i. 27; ii. 9; iv. 15; v. 3; vii. 8, 13; xv. 15; 1 Cor. v. 3; 2 Cor. iv. 17; v. 5; vii. 10 f.; ix. 11; xii. 12;—*ἐνεργεῖν*: Rom. vii. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 6, 11; 2 Cor. i. 6; iv. 12; Gal. ii. 8; iii. 5; v. 6). That in our section of Rom. vii. *θέλειν* has merely the sense of the intellectual thinking it good (*des erkenntnissmässigen für gut Haltens*), is confirmed on the one hand by the expressions *σύμφημι* and *συνήδομαι* (verses 16 and 22), which are interchanged with *θέλειν*, as it is, on the other, required by the whole context. The state of the man in need of redemption, before regeneration takes place, is distinguished morally from the state of the regenerate, not in such a manner, that in both alike there is present the willing of the good, and only in the latter is there wanting the execution of what is willed; but rather conversely in such a manner, that in the former the positive direction of the will towards the good is, in spite even of better knowing and wishing, not attained, while in the latter the transforming of the whole direction of the will is accomplished, but withal the *execution* of the good may possibly be still very defective. For in this case sin is in principle overcome and done away by the Spirit of God, although in individual cases the new direction cannot always effectually assert itself, because the former still makes its influence felt;

but for such an overcoming *in principle* of sin, the νόϋς with its θέλειν, that is, with all its good purposes and wishes, is not of itself able." The same conclusion practically is reached by Godet (on verse 15): "This will which puts itself on the side of the law is only a desire, a velleity, a simple *I should wish*, which miscarries in practice"; and again (on verse 18): "the verb designates a simple desire, an intention, rather than a fixed and deliberate decision (*décision arrêtée et réfléchie*)," as well as by Weiss, who says on verse 15:¹ "In the regenerate the Spirit works the θέλειν and the ἐνεργεῖν (Phil. ii. 13), as Meyer justly brings into prominence in opposition to Philippi, but here the discussion turns, if not on the mere *velleitas* of the Schoolmen (Tholuck), at any rate on a willing that remains constantly inoperative, that continues accordingly mere theory and never determines practice."

At Rom. viii. 10 we meet with a remarkable passage, which is admitted to be one of the most difficult of interpretation in connection with the Pauline use of πνεῦμα, and as to which we cannot but think that the exegetical instinct of Chrysostom, Calvin, and Grotius reached a more probable conclusion than that which has commended itself to the majority of more recent expositors. There is a

¹In the sixth edition (1881), revised by him, of "Meyer's Commentary," *ad loc.*

general agreement among expositors that in the earlier portion of chapter viii., from verse 2 onwards, the πνεῦμα spoken of is the divine Spirit, the source or the principle of the new life in the Christian (although M. Oltramare forms an exception, who thinks that he elucidates St. Paul's meaning by practically identifying νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ, νόμος τοῦ νοός and νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος, and expresses his surprise that so few should agree with him in regarding πνεῦμα as the superior spiritual part of man raised above the senses), while in the verses succeeding the tenth (13, 14, 15, 16) the import of πνεῦμα is usually accounted the same. But in verse 10 the contrast to σῶμα tends at first sight to suggest the taking of πνεῦμα in the corresponding sense of "the human spirit": "εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν δι' ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῶν διὰ δικαιοσύνην. Meyer, for instance, says: "το πνεῦμα, namely in contrast to the σῶμα, is necessarily not the *transcendent* (Holsten) or the Holy Spirit (Chrysostom and others); nor yet, as Hofmann turns the conception, the spirit which we now have *when Christ is in us* and *His righteousness is ours*; but simply our *human spirit*, i.e., the substratum of the personal self-consciousness. That the spirit of those who are here spoken of is filled with the Holy Spirit, is in itself a correct inference from the presupposition εἰ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, but is not implied in the word τὸ πνεῦμα, as

if this meant (Theodoret and De Wette) the human spirit pervaded by the divine Spirit, the pneumatic essence of the regenerate man." And Godet takes it of "the spiritual element in the believer, the characteristic organ in man for the perception and appropriation of the divine, by which the Spirit of God can penetrate into the soul and by it rule the body." But it cannot mean the human spirit *per se*, or "the natural spirit of man," as Schmidt would take it, because, as Weiss remarks, the passage speaks only of those in whom Christ is. And the latter scholar has preferred¹ to understand *πνεῦμα* as "the new spirit-life produced in us by the divine *πνεῦμα* (or the Christ in us) and pervaded by it, consequently the pneumatic essence (*Wesenheit*) of the regenerate."

This exegesis of Weiss is clearly more in keeping with the context and with the general tenor of the Apostle's teaching; but it is to be observed (1) that, while it professes to rest on the parallelism with *σῶμα*, it really departs from it, for, while *τὸ σῶμα* represents literally the one side of human nature proper, *τὸ πνεῦμα* is not the other side of that nature taken in and by itself, but a new element superinduced on it; (2) that, as thus put, it seems almost a pleonasm to say: "the new spirit-life

¹ In his *Biblische Theologie d. N. T.*, p. 397, note, and in his new edition of Meyer's *Commentary in loc.*

is life"; and (3) that, as we formerly remarked in regard to this special sense of *πνεῦμα* for which Weiss contends, it seems an unnecessary and confusing course to assume that *πνεῦμα* may mean not merely the power or cause of the new life wrought in man, but also the effect or result—the new life itself.

It appears to us, therefore, still better to adhere with Hofmann to the sense suggested by all the other uses of *πνεῦμα* in the preceding and following context—from which it is *à priori* improbable that St. Paul should thus suddenly perplex his readers by deviating—and to understand him as saying that in the Christian the divine Spirit—the Spirit of God and of Christ mentioned in viii. 9, and the indwelling Spirit spoken of immediately after—is the source and vehicle of life.

In fact the very deviation from strict parallelism of structure (which would have required overagainst the *νεκρόν* of the one clause the simple adjective ζῶν, or, as in the reading of one or two MSS., the verb ζῆ) and the change to the wider, higher, more absolute predicate ζωή, seem clearly to indicate that something more than such a mere parallelism was intended, and to make the reader at once fall back on the *πνεῦμα*, of which he had already learned so much. Nor can we attach any such importance as Weiss is disposed to concede to the argument against Hofmann's view, based by

Schmidt on the words *διὰ δικαιοσύνην*: "The Spirit of God is always in itself life, so that in its case the question wherefore or whereby it is so cannot at all arise, and the words *διὰ δικαιοσύνην* would form an addition as superfluous (*müssigen*) as singular (*seltamen*)."¹ What is superfluous is rather this exception taken to the words; for the Apostle is specifying not a reason why the Spirit is "life" in itself, but a reason why, or a ground in connection with which, the Spirit is life for the persons addressed, if they are Christ's, or conversely if Christ is in them. He had previously discussed the close connection of death with sin, and of life with *δικαιοσύνη*, especially in chapter v.; and he had but a few verses before, at the beginning of the chapter, brought significantly side by side the exemption of believers from condemnation and their deliverance by the law of the Spirit of life from the law of sin and death. And, if he was not of opinion with Lüdemann that his earlier chapters as to the righteousness bestowed for Christ's sake and received by faith were merely *ad captandum* arguments not reflecting his own view, what was more natural than that he should in this way associate the quickening power of the gift of the Spirit with that other gift of righteousness which he had already gratefully commemorated.²

¹ Paulinische Christologie, p. 36.

² Calvin *in loc.* says: "Porro ante admoniti sunt lectores, ne

The circumstance that in this passage St. Paul uses the expression "if Christ be in you" when he had just before spoken of the "Spirit of God," and then of the "Spirit of Christ," has been held to indicate that he treated these ideas as quite interchangeable; and this conclusion is assumed to be confirmed by the apparently still more explicit statement at 2 Cor. iii. 17: ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν. Holsten tells us that "τὸ πνεῦμα is in St. Paul's conception first the substantial essence (*Wesen*) of the Divine subject and of the transcendent Χριστός, the κύριος τοῦ πνεύματος, and then is sent by God and from God into the hearts of believers" (p. 384). And Pfeiderer states that at Rom. viii. 16, 26, "the indwelling Spirit of God or Christ is not different from the indwelling Christ himself (verse 9, comp. 10)"—although there is nothing said in either of these passages to identify the Spirit with Christ, and the use of them for that purpose proceeds simply on the assumption that the identification is already proved by verses 9 and 10—and he adds, a little further on: "As a concrete hypostasis, the divine per vocabulum Spiritus animam nostram intelligant, sed regenerationis Spiritum; quem Vitam appellat Paulus, non modo quia vivit ac viget in nobis, sed quia vivificat nos suo vigore, donec extincta mortali carne perfecte demum renovet." It is not necessary that, along with Calvin's view of πνεῦμα we should take his fanciful interpretation of σῶμα as *crassior massa*.

πνεῦμα subsists (except in God himself) only in the exalted Christ, for *ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν* (2 Cor. iii. 17).”

Now we might reasonably maintain that, even assuming our inability to give any satisfactory explanation of the passages thus adduced, such an author as St. Paul was hardly likely to use language after so loose and indefinite a fashion as to employ different terms for one and the same idea; that he must be conceived to have chosen on each occasion the words fittest for the expression of his thought: and that his more concise and obscure utterances must be interpreted in the light of those that are more numerous, full, and explicit, rather than the converse. Even if one or two passages should seem to indicate the identity in some sense of the *πνεῦμα* with Christ, this cannot legitimately neutralise the effect of the great mass of expressions, which clearly imply a distinction. But in point of fact there is no sufficient reason for resting so important a conclusion on the passages in question.

At Rom. viii., 9-11, it is obvious that the Apostle designedly varies his form of expression. He speaks of “the Spirit of God” dwelling in his readers, then of the “having the Spirit of Christ” as a necessary mark of belonging to him, then of the spiritual effect of “Christ” being in them, and lastly

of the result, as regards the eventual quickening of the mortal body, of the indwelling of "the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead." Are we to suppose that the Apostle varied his expressions without any reason, or simply in order to pursue a play on words? If not, then we must seek a reason for the transition, and it is not difficult to find it. He frequently uses other language that betokens a close union of believers with Christ—a presence of Christ and of His life in them—in respect of which they are, as it were, a part of Christ (as in Gal. ii. 20: "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me;" Col. i. 27) and elsewhere he indicates that this presence of Christ is in and through the Spirit. The Spirit is His, is sent forth by Him, is the principle and organ of His presence, and the effect of the Spirit's action is to make Christ live in us. Wherever there is the presence of the Spirit of Christ, there, according to the Apostle's teaching, Christ himself may be said to be. But in this case St. Paul substitutes the "Christ is in you" for "Christ's Spirit is in you," because he desired specially to mark—"to bring more forcibly into relief," as Godet puts it (*ressortir plus énergiquement la solidarité*)—the closeness of the tie connecting His *person* and *ours*, and so to prepare the way for verse 11, where the resurrection of Christ is presented as the pledge of ours.

As to the other passage, 2 Cor. iii. 17, we may

remark, first, that hardly any verse of the New Testament has been subjected to a greater variety of interpretations, and yet it is chosen with as much confidence as a foundation for important inferences as though its meaning were entirely clear and admitted on all hands. Baur, for instance, Holsten, and Pfeleiderer find here a simple affirmation that Christ is an *immaterial substance formed of light!* Some have explained the passage by suggesting that *πνεῦμα* is to be taken in quite a different sense from what it usually bears, while others have sought to change the meaning of *κύριος*; and there have been many attempts to weaken or explain away its apparent tenor on the ordinary interpretation. Secondly, assuming it to apply to the actual personal Christ as *κύριος*, and to mean, as Meyer explains it: "*the Lord, to whom the heart is converted, is not different from the (Holy) Spirit, who is received, namely, in conversion, and is the divine life-power that makes free,*" we might be content to accept also Meyer's view of its significance: "That this was meant, not of *hypostatical identity*, but according to the dynamical *economic* point of view that the fellowship of Christ, into which we enter through conversion, is the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, was obvious of itself to the believing consciousness of the readers, and is also put beyond doubt by the following *τὸ πνεῦμα κυρίου.*" But, thirdly, it seems to us that the explana-

tion of the passage is to be sought from the more *immediate* context, and that the key to it is given in the language of Calvin *in loc.*: "Praesens sententia nihil ad Christi essentiam, sed officium duntaxat exprimit. Cohaeret enim cum superioribus, ubi habuimus Legis doctrinam esse literalem, nec mortuam solum, sed etiam materiam mortis. E converso nunc Christum vocat ejus spiritum, quo significat, tunc demum vivam et vivificam fore, si a Christo inspiretur. Accedat anima ad corpus, et fit vivus homo." St. Paul had, at the 6th verse, described himself as a "minister of the new covenant, not of the letter but of the spirit; for the letter killeth, but the spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα) giveth life." He had contrasted the ministration of death in the law with the ministration of righteousness; and after referring to the veil on the heart of the Israelites when the law was read, had said that on turning to the Lord the veil should be taken away. He adds: "Now the Lord is the spirit"—the spirit previously mentioned (such is the force of the article)—the spirit that vivifies the law and makes it minister to freedom. This contextual explanation has commended itself with minor differences of detail to Erasmus, Olshausen, Neander, Ewald and Klöpffer.

We cannot see much force in the exception taken to this interpretation by Meyer on the score of the Apostle's subsequently and naturally reverting to the

usual expression *πνεῦμα κυρίου*; while it derives support rather than the reverse from the peculiar expression at the close of verse 18: *καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος*, whether we take it as meaning "even as from the Lord the Spirit," or, as seems more probable, "the Lord of the Spirit." But it would unquestionably obtain greatly increased probability, if we felt ourselves at liberty to accept the ingenious and, as I venture to think, singularly felicitous conjectural emendation of Dr. Hort, by which he at once disposes of the *πνεῦμα κυρίου* here that forms Meyer's difficulty, gets rid of the perplexity of construing the *κυρίου πνεύματος* in verse 18, and accounts for the origin of the remarkable predicate *τὸ κύριον* attached to the Spirit in the Creed of Constantinople.¹

We have thus seen that St. Paul employs the term *πνεῦμα* on various occasions to denote the human mind alongside of what we have recognised

¹The following is Dr. Hort's most interesting note on 2 Cor. iii. 17: "*οὗ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα Κυρίου, ἐλευθερία.*] These words contain no obvious difficulty; yet it may be suspected that *Κυρίου* is a primitive error for *κύριον* (Y for N). First, the former clause of the verse does not in sense lead naturally up to this clause, whether the emphasis be laid on *πνεῦμα* or on *Κυρίου* (or *κυρίου*). Secondly, in *ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος* at the end of verse 18 neither principal word can naturally be taken as a substantive dependent on the other, nor both as substantives in apposition. The simplest construction is to take *κυρίου* as an adjective ('a Spirit exercising lordship,' or, by a paraphrase, 'a Spirit which is Lord'); and apparently

as his predominant use of the term to signify the new spiritual power given to men in Christ. What, it may be asked, is the relation between the two? To this question as it stands exegesis does not furnish any direct reply; but it must not be supposed on that account to have no voice or function as regards the attempts of speculation to provide an answer. Its function is simply to present fairly, and fully the Scriptural data, to ask that they shall all be taken into account, and to urge that, in any case, a clear line shall be drawn between the facts as Scripturally vouched for, and the speculative efforts to systematise or harmonise them.

When we find Usteri, *e.g.*, "readily conceding that St. Paul has not conceived to himself the notions of *νοῦς*, *πίστις*, and *πνεῦμα* in the logical definiteness" which they gain in Usteri's hands, but holding it "indisputable that the germ of the latter lies in the

the Scriptural source of the remarkable adjectival phrase *τὸ κύριον* in the (so-called) Constantinopolitan creed (*το πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον τὸ κυρίον τὸ ζωοποιόν*) can be only verse 18 construed in this manner, the third in the triad of epithets being likewise virtually found in this chapter (verse 6) as well as elsewhere. This adjectival use of *κυρίον* in the genitive would, however, be so liable to be misunderstood, or even overlooked altogether, that St. Paul could hardly use it without some further indication of his meaning. If he wrote *οὗ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα κύριον, ἐλευθερία*, not only do the two clauses of verse 17 fall into natural sequence, but a clue is given which conducts at once to the true sense of *ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος*."

Pauline conception, which it is our task to place on a deeper basis and to justify in logic;" when we learn that the distinction thus germinally present to St. Paul takes "νοῦς as the principle of abstract understanding thinking on a being objectively confronting it; πίστις as the principle of immediate knowing, of experience, of feeling, where the objective being has become a subjective; πνεῦμα, the cancelling of the distinction between understanding and faith, and the gathering of them up (*Zusammenfassung*) into a higher concrete unity. . . . The third and highest stage, embracing under it the two others, is the consciousness of the spirit, which knows itself existing out of, or rather in, God;" or again, when we are told, as to the trilogy in 1 Thess. v. 23, that, while "σῶμα is the animal body with all its functions, and ψυχή—the soul—is the animal life-principle of the body, including the functions of thinking, feeling, willing, which constitute the individual human life (νοῦς, καρδία)"—a view of ψυχή, by the way, not coinciding in its terms with any of those we have formerly touched on!—"the πνεῦμα is the spirit issuing from God and uniting man with the being (*Wesen*) of God, a self-conscious power (*Kraft*), in which the intellectual and the moral principle are identical as in a higher, the essential nature (*Wesenheit*) of God, which individualises itself in the Christian, but is in all alike;"

we may be of opinion that we have here the germ of a philosophy rightly reading the mystery of the relation between the divine and the human, or a mere play of dialectics deftly ringing the changes on words and ready to make or cancel distinctions at pleasure, but a candid exegesis tells us that St. Paul is not to be charged with either the merit or demerit of such speculations ingeniously read into his words.

Again, when we find M. Reuss, after, as is usual with him, a very clear and fair statement of the two different ways in which the Spirit of God is presented by St. Paul as related to the spirit of man in the "mystic communication"—as existing and acting in us *by the side of* the human spirit, or as having *taken the place of* our spirit, identifying itself with it, or, as it were, absorbing it—proceeding to say that the formulæ expressing the latter view "are more in keeping with the system as a whole (*conformes à l'ensemble du système*), more adequate to its generative thought than those which are associated with the other point of view," we must point out that, whatever may be the value of the judgment thus expressed, it does not rest on the ground of exegesis, which establishes both sets of facts, and requires that, on the principle of an author being supposed to know his own mind and to be consistent with himself, room must be found for both within

the system as a whole, and the one be explained in terms of the other.

Dr. Pfleiderer goes still farther. Speaking of the two sorts of expressions used by St. Paul, he describes the second as "admitting no distinction between the divine and the human," and subsequently as "not suggesting, relatively not admitting" such a distinction; and, after quoting some instances, especially such expressions as *πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως* (2 Cor. iv. 9), *πνεῦμα πραότητος* (1 Cor. iv. 21), *ἀγάπη τοῦ πνεύματος* (Rom. xv. 30), in which he conceives it much more natural (*es liegt viel näher*) to take the *πνεῦμα* simply as the *subject* of these virtues than (according to the usual view) to separate it from the Christian subject as the *cause* of the virtues in question, he adds, "In all these and similar passages the distinction between objective *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* and subjective Christian spirit is not so much exegetical precision (*Pünktlichkeit*) as rather scholastic abstraction, which certainly misses the meaning of the Apostle (*den Sinn des Apostels gewiss verfehlt*). This meaning we shall have to see rather in the view that the divine *πνεῦμα* and the natural-human become united (*sich einigen*) in the Christian into the unity of a *new subject*, of a *καὶνὸς* or *πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος* (thus substantially; comp. 1 Cor. vi. 17), but so, that this union is not one absolutely complete (*fertige*) from the outset, but one

always in the mere course of being carried out, consequently still always one that subsists only partially; hence the two substances are still always in another aspect of two kinds (*zweierteil*), and are related to one another as the active and giving to the passive and receiving."

Now it is to be observed, first, that Dr. Pfeiderer deals with several distinctions which are not precisely equivalent. He had set himself to discuss the relation "between the new Christian *πνεῦμα* and the natural *πνεῦμα* of man," or, as he otherwise expresses it, "between the divine and human *πνεῦμα*"; but at the outset of this passage he introduces a third distinction which is not coincident with either of these, viz., that "between objective *πνεῦμα ἄγιον* and subjective *Christian* spirit." Even assuming the latter kind of distinction to be alien to St. Paul's mode of conception, we still leave the question to be answered—What is the relation between the divine and the human elements, both of which are unquestionably recognised—or between the natural and the specifically Christian *πνεῦμα* in man? Further, it may be remarked that, while the distinction between the objective and subjective may be scholastic as regards the terms in which we find it convenient to express it, it has only arisen out of the facts given to exegesis by St. Paul, and is simply the result of its dealing *precisely* with

these facts in accordance with its laws—a treatment, which, so far from being reproached as “punctiliousness,” is but legitimately due to any author who is presumed to have had a meaning to express, and to have known how to express it. St. Paul unquestionably speaks of the *πνεῦμα* now as a power acting *on* man, now as an energy acting *in* him; and to ignore that distinction, or to refuse to apply it, as undoubtedly given in some passages, to the interpretation of others where it may not be so explicitly set forth, on the pretext of its being a scholastic abstraction, is just to deny to exegesis the means of effectually doing its work. But, thirdly, we have to observe that Dr Pfeleiderer's mode of getting out of the difficulty, and of discovering the meaning of St. Paul without resorting to scholastic subtleties, is a mere cutting and not an untying of the knot. He tells us that the divine *πνεῦμα* and the natural human *πνεῦμα* join themselves in the Christian to form the unity of a *new subject*, of a *καινός* or *πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος*; but it is obvious that, even granting this to be a correct account of the matter, it does not at all explain how this unity is brought about. There are admittedly *two* factors at the outset: how do they come to be blended into the *unity* of the new subject? Dr. Pfeleiderer, who is skilful in resolving unity into difference and difference into unity, should hardly have been content with simply affirming the

substantial synthesis. Fourthly, he has no sooner propounded this "unity of a new subject" than he is dissatisfied with it. It is not complete, but only in course of growth; it exists, and yet it is partially non-existent; the two *substances* that form a junction insist on being differentiated; and the explanation, thus admitted by its author to be inadequate, savours more of dialectic subtlety than of exegetical candour. Lastly, we may be allowed to point out that a slight ambiguity underlies Dr. Pfeiderer's use of the expression a *new subject*. Does it mean, as one would naturally take it to mean, that a new Ego has taken the place of the former, and that the Ego, which is able to call itself *καιός*, has no consciousness of identity with that which is characterised as *παλαιός*? This, of course, cannot be; for there is a continuous chain of consciousness identifying the Christian Ego that is new with that which existed anterior to the renewal; and it is only in virtue of this conscious identity that he is able to distinguish the new state from the old. There is therefore not a *new subject* in this, the strict and legitimate, sense of the term; and, whatever strong expressions St. Paul may use to denote the entireness of the change, he cannot have meant to obliterate the continuous sense of personal identity as between the new and the old. But, if so, the natural human consciousness at any rate is carried

forward into the Christian subject; and the question still remains where Dr. Pfeleiderer found it: "How is the divine element, superinduced on the human, related to the latter?"

To that question St. Paul does not give any direct answer; but the principles of rational exegesis require that, in any attempt to deal with the question, we should take all his statements into account, that we should correlate the results of our interpretation, and that, instead of assuming him to have indulged in meaningless duplication, or unreconciled antinomies, or mere vague mysticism, we should accept his utterances according to the limitations which they necessarily impose on each other. It is beyond doubt that St. Paul ascribes the new life of the believer in its inception and in its growth to the divine *πνεῦμα* acting on and in man as a motive power; but it is also true that he addresses to believers appeals and exhortations which presuppose a subject distinguishable from, and receptive of, that *πνεῦμα*, summoned to a walk accordant with it, and privileged to bear witness along with it. St. Paul recognises both a divine and a human factor; and in any attempt to systematise his teaching, both must have a place without the one excluding or yet absorbing the other.

It is no part of our present aim to pursue this inquiry from a theological or from a speculative point of

view, although, if we did so, it might not be difficult to show that the Hebrew conception of power and life is more fruitful of light and help in pursuing it than the imported Greek concept of substance. And we shall only, before leaving it, quote the words of Immer, as giving, in brief compass, a fair account of that remarkable correlation, on which so much of the Apostle's teaching turns:—"The principle of the new life is the *πνεῦμα*, which is at decisive passages distinguished from the human *πνεῦμα* (1 Cor. ii. 11 ; Rom. viii. 16), and is conceived as an objective and supernatural principle. The relation between the two is partly one of homogeneity, since otherwise they would not both be designated by the same expression, and since both—in distinction from the *νοῦς* as the reflective understanding (1 Cor. xiv. 14, 15, 19 ; Rom. viii. 2, comp. vii. 23, 25)—denote the immediateness [*Unmittelbarkeit, i.e., the absence of mediate agency*] of spirit-life ; partly one of difference, since according to St. Paul the divine and the human *πνεῦμα* are related as upper and lower [*Oben und Unten*=literally, *above and below*]. Yet it is a relation of correspondence ; otherwise the human *πνεῦμα* could not *συμμαρτυρεῖν* that we are God's children."

The distinction thus recognised by exegesis between the divine and the human *πνεῦμα* has naturally led translators to facilitate its apprehension by

employing an initial capital to mark the former, wherever they conceive it to be clearly referred to, and more especially where the Spirit appears to be regarded as the objective Personal Source of the new life. Whether the introduction of such a note of distinction falls within a translator's province, may be a question open to debate on hermeneutical grounds ; but, if it is legitimate in any case, it must be so in that of a distinction which has been on all hands—for Dr. Holsten's extreme view on the one hand, and that of M. Oltramare on the other, do not count for much in presence of such a consensus of expositors—admitted, and the importance of which is obvious on the face of it. That very importance, however, makes it essential that, if it is acted on, it should be regulated by some definite principle—whether the line be drawn as between the divine and the human, or as between the objective Personal power and its subjective manifestation in the Christian—and should be uniformly applied.

In this respect the Revisers of the Authorised Version do not seem to me to have had, or to have been successful in always applying, a definite rule. It is difficult to see, for instance, why at Gal. v. 17 we find : “ the flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh,” while at Rom. viii. 6 we find : “ the mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the spirit is life and peace.” If the ἐπι-

θυμία appears to require personification in the one case, the *φρόνημα* might fairly claim it in the other. And, if it should be maintained that the rendering of Gal. v. 17 by "Spirit" is required by the immediately preceding "Walk by the Spirit" of verse 16, that of Rom. viii. 2, "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" might fairly be taken to govern the import of the *πνεῦμα* in the immediate sequel: "walk after the spirit" (verse 4). Indeed, as regards the whole section—Rom. viii. 1-17—I venture to think that the exegetical consistency of the Authorised Version in this particular stands out in advantageous contrast to the alternation of the Revisers.

Still more¹ is it to be regretted that, while thus failing to give full effect to a distinction which exegesis warrants, and the bringing out of which obviously facilitates the apprehension of the Apostle's meaning, the Revisers should on the other hand have continued to maintain a distinction of rendering, for which exegesis certainly furnishes no warrant, and which cannot but be for the English reader perplexing, if not misleading. The primary requisite of accurate translation—uniformity of rendering—has been signally disregarded in the case of *πνεῦμα*, where not only has the antiquated term "ghost"—which no longer carries for the English reader the significance that still fully per-

tains to its German form "Geist"—been retained by the side of "spirit" to suggest to the reader a difference which does not exist in the original; but, even in the case of the Third Person of the Trinity, the identity apparent in the Greek has been obscured by the use now of "Holy Ghost," and anon of "Holy Spirit." The rectifying of such an anomaly as this would seem one of the first and most obvious of the duties to which the Revisers were called; and if, as is clear, they could not have substituted the word "Ghost" for "Spirit" in the case of such expressions as "walking by or after the Spirit" (Gal. v. 16; Rom. viii. 4), "fellowship of the Spirit" (Phil. ii. 1), "grieve not the Holy Spirit of God" (Eph. iv. 30), to say nothing of the cases where the reference is to the "spirit" of man, they had no alternative but to adopt the converse course, and to employ throughout the rendering—to which there could be no rational objection either on exegetical or other grounds—"the Holy Spirit." It seems strange that they should not have made this change of their own motion; but more strange that they should have declined to comply with it when suggested by their American associates, who had the candour and the courage to say: "For 'Holy Ghost' adopt uniformly the rendering 'Holy Spirit.'"¹ That a great oppor-

¹ It is difficult to see on what principle the Revisers abstained from accepting most of the suggestions of the Ameri-

tunity of redressing an imperfection and of reproducing for the English reader the *πνεῦμα* of the original was thus missed, can only be accounted for by supposing that the reverence for a liturgical formula and its hallowed associations outweighed

can Company, especially those applying to "classes of passages." I ventured to comment on some of these cases in a letter to the Editor of the *Academy*, July 9, 1881. Few who have an opportunity of looking into the American Revised Version will fail to see in it a great improvement as compared with its English prototype; and nothing can better indicate the mistaken course pursued in the latter, than the form in which the Americans in their Appendix record "the readings and renderings preferred by the English Revisers." I subjoin one or two instances:—

"For 'try,' or 'make trial of' ('trial'), where enticement to what is wrong is not meant, substitute 'tempt' ('temptation').

For 'demon' ('demons') representing the Greek words *δαίμων*, *δαίμόνιον*, substitute 'devil' ('devils').

For 'know' in Acts iii. 17; vii. 40; Rom. xi. 2; Phil. i. 22, substitute 'wist.'

In many passages, too numerous to specify, substitute 'which' for 'who' or 'that' when used of persons."

And, as to the question with which we are here concerned, the following is their note:—

"For 'Holy Spirit' (which occurs more than 90 times) adopt the rendering 'Holy Ghost,' except in Matt. xii. 32; Mark iii. 29; xii. 36; Luke ii. 25, 26; iv. 1; x. 21; xi. 13; xii. 10, 12; John i. 33; xiv. 26; Acts ii. 4; vi. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 3; Eph. i. 13; iv. 30; 1 Thes. iv. 8; Jude 20.

In Luke xi. 13; Eph. i. 13; iv. 30; 1 Thess. iv. 8, 'Holy Spirit' is the rendering of the Authorised Version, as it is in the Old Testament (Ps. li. 11; Is. lxiii. 10, 11)."

what was due to the truth and unity of the Scriptures whence that formula came, and to which it traced its sacred significance. It is scarcely matter for surprise that a Revision, which amidst its undoubted excellence in many respects fails to deal with this and other matters of real importance, while it introduces numerous minor changes of dubious value, should not be accepted by scholars as adequate or final.