

## VII.

## THE HUMAN PNEUMA.

WE have still to consider another set of passages, in which *πνεῦμα* appears to be used of the mind or spirit of man, of the inward self-conscious power which feels, thinks, and wills. There is, first, the passage 1 Cor. ii. 11, where the knowledge which the Spirit of God has of the deep things of God is illustrated by the analogous knowledge which man's spirit has of what pertains to man: "for who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man which is in him." Then at Rom. viii. 16 the spirit of man seems expressly contradistinguished from the Spirit of God, which is represented as bearing witness with, or to, our spirit. In ten other passages *πνεῦμα* is accompanied by a personal pronoun in the genitive, or an adjectival personal pronoun: "my spirit, thy spirit, your spirit," whereby it is marked as a possession or property of man, which he may fairly speak of as his own (Rom. i. 9; 1 Cor. v. 4; xvi. 18; 2 Cor. vii. 13; xi. 13; 1 Thess. v. 23). In four of these the

personal spirit is placed in the relation of the object or recipient of the divine grace in Christ (Gal. vi. 15: "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit;" Phil. iv. 23; Philem. 23; 2 Tim. iv. 22). At 1 Thess. v. 23 the *πνεῦμα* is not only accompanied by the personal pronoun *ὑμῶν*, but is correlated with the *ψυχὴ* and *σῶμα* of man; "may your spirit, and soul, and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." Lastly, in four or five passages *πνεῦμα* is placed in contrast with *σῶμα* (or with *σὰρξ*) under circumstances which most naturally suggest the other side of human nature proper—something which equally with man's body may be said to belong to him (1 Cor. v. 3; vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Col. ii. 5; Rom. viii. 10).

How are these passages to be explained? Holsten, in keeping with his view as to the Pauline conception of *πνεῦμα* as a divine element that only becomes immanent in man with and through Christ, maintains—notwithstanding the adjuncts that appear to point to something belonging to man in virtue of his nature—that in all these instances the *πνεῦμα* spoken of is not a "human-creaturely spirit," or an organ in man corresponding to, and receptive of, the divine Spirit, but the divine *πνεῦμα* itself regarded as immanent in man and, as it were, subjectively appropriated. This view has the merit of con-

sistency ; but it rests on a forced exegesis, which has failed to commend itself to any of the writers who have succeeded him. That at 1 Cor. ii. 11 the *πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* is to be identified with the *πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου* of the 12th verse, notwithstanding the circumstance that the Apostle says of the latter that he had *not* received it ; or that at Rom. viii. 16 the *πνεῦμα ἡμῶν* is to be identified with the *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας*, the transcendent divine Spirit of ver. 15, so that the witness is borne by the divine Spirit objective along with, or to, the same divine Spirit subjective : or that at Gal. vi. 18 and elsewhere the spirit for which the Apostle wishes the presence of Christ's grace is the divine Spirit already indwelling in the believer—are suggestions not only at variance with the most obvious and natural construction of the words, but of a far-fetched and artificial character, under which the Apostle's meaning is reduced to a minimum, if not to a mere play on words.

Nor does it seem to us that the view of Weiss—though not liable to so strong objections as that of Holsten—meets adequately the circumstances of all the cases. He conceives that “ *πνεῦμα* in the specific sense has no place in the Pauline psychology,” although he grants that at some places (such as 1 Cor. v. 5 ; Col. ii. 5) St. Paul follows a popular *usus loquendi*, according to which *πνεῦμα* would

be substantially synonymous with  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ ; but he holds that  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  is only ascribed to regenerate Christians, and that, where  $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha\ \eta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$  is used, what is meant is the new spiritual life wrought in us by the Spirit. He maintains that at several of the passages to which Schmidt and Wendt appeal as proofs of the ordinary anthropological sense of  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  (such as 1 Cor. xvi. 18: "they refreshed my spirit and yours," 2 Cor. vii. 13: "his spirit (that of Titus) hath been refreshed by you all," 2 Cor. ii. 13: "I had no relief for my spirit") the reference is to *religious* relations—not by any means to states and moods of the natural mental life, but to such as pertain to the persons in question simply and solely in the sphere of their *Christian life as such*, and that the same explanation applies to Gal. vi. 18, to Rom. i. 9: "whom I serve in spirit," and several other passages.

But while it may be granted that this view is exegetically allowable—in so far as it is to a certain extent in keeping with what is the general and dominant usage of the term by the Apostle, and in so far as it strives to preserve a certain unity of conception throughout—it encounters, as it seems to us, two considerable difficulties arising out of that very prevailing usage to which it seeks to conform. 1st. Elsewhere  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  denotes the divine energy operating on, or acting in, man—a causal principle

or agency, whereas in the cases with which we are now concerned it must denote the effect or result thereby produced. It is not a question merely of the term signifying now the giver, now the gift; but of its signifying now that gift as the principle and motive power of the new life, and now the life itself thence resulting as its fruit. It is improbable that the Apostle should thus use the word in both these senses. And 2nd. the very constant association of the term elsewhere with what is distinctively divine, its attribution to God and to Christ, its predicates of power and life, the recognition of it as objective and as, even when immanent, a divine gift—which we are ever meeting elsewhere—render it unlikely that the Apostle should have designated it thus directly and unqualifiedly as a personal possession. It seems to us better, accordingly, to regard the Apostle as speaking of something that he may with more warrant call his own; and we are confirmed in this view, when we find that, even after applying Weiss's explanation of the new spiritual life to the cases in which the personal pronoun is used, there remain various instances of an indubitable reference to a human *πνεῦμα*, such as 2 Cor. ii. 11 and 1 Thess. v. 23. Seeing that beyond all question Paul thus had the conception of a *πνεῦμα* belonging to man as such, it is most natural to take this as the conception present to his mind, wherever

he speaks of "my spirit" or "your spirit," or employs it as a counterpart to "body" (except, possibly, at Rom. viii. 10, of which more hereafter).

But what is this human *πνεῦμα*? Proceeding chiefly on the basis of the passage in the earliest of the Pauline epistles, 1 Thess. v. 23, where *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, and *σῶμα* are brought together as if constituent elements of human nature, various expositors and Biblical psychologists have worked out in different forms the theory of a trichotomous division of man as having the sanction of St. Paul's name; and elaborate treatises have been written, partly in vindication of its title to rest on Biblical ground, partly in application of its alleged results to the elucidation of Christian doctrine, *e.g.*, the well-known work of Dr. Heard on the Tripartite Nature of Man. Apart from this book, which is of the nature of a special pleading, the view of a trichotomy has been more or less supported by Usteri, Neander, Lünemann (on 1 Thess. v. 23), Auberlen, Beck, and Delitzsch.

The two latter may be regarded as the chief expositors of what is called Biblical psychology; but, interesting and valuable as are their treatises, neither of them has succeeded in placing the subject on a proper exegetico-historical basis. It is with some difficulty that the Biblical facts lend themselves to be handled in the sense of modern psychological distinctions foreign to Jewish modes of thought;

and the result too often is that they lose under the process their Biblical impress, without acquiring any valid title to pass current in their philosophical guise. The meaning of Scripture, which is tolerably clear to the ordinary reader who takes its language in the sense of popular usage, becomes darkened rather than elucidated by the attempt to impose on it the distinctions—in themselves often obscure, precarious, or even baseless—of modern speculation. The book of Dr. Beck,<sup>1</sup> which was some years ago translated into English probably as well and as far as its uncouth form and unmanageable phraseology would allow, contains, like everything that has come from him, much that is fresh and suggestive; but its value is greatly impaired by the utter absence of a historical method of treatment. Scripture is dealt with as a whole with little regard to the difference or succession of its parts; as if, to use Dr. Laidlaw's words, "the whole had been written contemporaneously, and as if every text bore with equal directness on the nature of the soul." The fuller and more elaborate treatise of Dr. Delitzsch,<sup>2</sup> translated into English with care and success, though not

<sup>1</sup> *Umriss der Biblischen Seelenlehre: ein Versuch.* 3rd edition, Stuttgart, 1871. Translated under the title "Outlines of Biblical Psychology," Edin. 1877.

<sup>2</sup> *System der Biblischen Psychologie*, 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1861. Translated by Rev. Robert E. Wallis, Ph.D. in Messrs. Clark's Foreign Theological Library, Edin. 1869.

always with adequate precision, by Dr. Wallis, takes more account of the processes of exegesis, and of the distinctions of age and authorship in Scripture ; but instead of starting from an exegetical inquiry and resting its more general conclusions on a careful induction of the Biblical statements bearing on anthropology, it sets out from the *a priori* basis of what are called "the eternal presuppositions," which include not merely the ideal—but also real—preexistence of man, and the Trinity as the divine archetype, but also the divine *δόξα*, wherein God, threefold in persons, reveals Himself as sevenfold in powers and manifestations. The result is an ingenious mosaic of Biblical facts, psychological explanations, and theosophic speculation, as to which it is no easy matter in the long run to distinguish how much really belongs to the Scriptural foundation, and how much to the superstructure raised on it by the varied erudition and versatile fancy of the illustrious writer.<sup>1</sup>

So far as the question now before us is concerned, the human *πνεῦμα* is, by those who differentiate it from *ψυχή*, variously conceived, according as the difference is held to be a difference of nature, or of faculties and functions. The more extreme view

<sup>1</sup> A brief discussion of the trichotomous theories will be found in Dr. Laidlaw's *Cunningham Lectures on the Bible Doctrine of Man*, p. 60 ff., and a fuller account in his *Appendix*, notes F. and G., p. 306-329.

assumes that man consists of  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , the material element, which forms the physical basis of his being ; the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ , which is the principle of animal life ; and the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ , as the higher principle of the intellectual nature, of reason. Others have preferred to speak of the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  and  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  as different sides or functions of the one Ego or inner man ; the former being generally held to include the feelings and appetites, the latter to embrace the higher powers that are more specially distinctive of man. Thus Lüne-mann says (on 1 Thess. v. 23): " $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  denotes the higher and purely spiritual side of the inner life, what is elsewhere called by Paul  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  (reason) ;  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is the lower side, which comes in contact with the region of the senses." Beck gives the following oracular utterance : " The spirit forms for the individual life the *principle* and the *power* in which it subsists ; the soul forms the *seat* of the same, its *vehicle* and *conductor* (*Träger und Leiter*) ; the body, the *vessel*, and *organ*, so that each is peculiar in its kind, but only in connection with the others (Matth. x. 28 ; 1 Thess. v. 23)."<sup>1</sup> Delitzsch, after saying that " spirit and soul are of one nature (*Wesen*), but different substances," proceeds : " But if the form of expression be preferred that the soul is a *tertium quid* not substantially but potentially self-subsistent between spirit and body, belonging as regards its nature

<sup>1</sup> Umriss der Bibl. Seelenlehre, p. 35.

to the side of the spirit, we are not opposed to putting it so. The matter of more moment is that the soul, whether it be named substance or potency, is not the spirit itself, but another thing conditioned by it, although standing very much closer to it than the body." <sup>1</sup> And he adds, at intervals, the following

<sup>1</sup> System der Bibl. Psychologie, p. 96. In a note he refers to the view of Dr. von Zezschwitz, who, at p. 37 of his suggestive lecture entitled "Profangrätigkeit und Biblischer Sprachgeist," with entire correctness according to Dr. Delitzsch, defines the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  in man as "the supreme spirit-power (*Geistesmacht*), holding together, governing, penetrating all powers (*Kräfte*) of the soul and of the body in virtue of its own connection with God." This looks like a mixing up of the human and divine aspects of the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ ; and it is but fair to Dr. von Zezschwitz to add that he has just before described the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  as "the psychological organ for the intercourse (*Wechselverkehr*) of man with God," and that his definition quoted above is expressly qualified by the clause "where it subsists in fulness of life and in its just position." He states, moreover, clearly enough the difficulties that beset the attempt to exhibit a Biblical psychology: namely, the need, so far as concerns  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ , of separating in our conception elements that Scripture presents as *de facto* blended, the working of the divine Spirit and the subsistence of the human spirit; and the fact that it has to deal, not with the presentation of a fixed spiritual state always alike, but with a state of flux and development that changes with the changed relations of the two factors. But it does not seem to us that with all his ingenuity he has successfully surmounted those difficulties. His practical conclusion is thus announced (at p. 50): "Any one who does not force on Scripture a dogmatic system must acknowledge that it speaks dichotomously of the parts viewed in themselves, trichotomously of the living reality, but everywhere in such

illustrations of his meaning: "The human soul is related to the human spirit as the divine Doxa is related to the triune divine nature. That is a comparison which is certainly not carried out exactly so in Scripture, but for which it affords all the needful premisses."<sup>1</sup> "The spirit is *spiritus spiratus*, and animates the body as *spiritus spirans*. The spirit is (let it be well marked!) the inner of the soul, the soul the outer of the spirit; for there is no inner without an outer, and no outer without an inner."<sup>2</sup> It is scarcely necessary to quote other definitions, such as that which takes the *πνεῦμα* as immediate self-consciousness—as it were, the "feeling" of Schleiermacher — which knows only "intuitionis ratione" (Krumm), or that of a "more exalted life-potency," referred to by Holsten. Distinctions of this nature do not in reality throw much light on the subject. All such refining is simply misapplied ingenuity without adequate Scriptural basis;

a manner as to preserve the *unity* in the original plan of human nature [*mit Wahrung des principie'll auf Einheit ange'egten Menschenwesens*]."

<sup>1</sup> Bibl. Psychol., p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Bibl. Psychol., p. 98. He illustrates this relation between centre and circumference by a reference to Philo's comparison of the *νοῦς* in the *ψυχὴ* to the pupil in the eye; and to a passage in the *Constitutiones Apostolicae*, which describes the *νοῦς* as the charioteer of the soul (vii. 34. 3: *νοῦς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡνίοχος ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπιστήσας*).

the grounds on which the distinctions are sought to be established are too slight and narrow to sustain so weighty an inference.

The main argument, as we have already indicated, that is adduced in favour of a trichotomous scheme is based on 1 Thess. v. 23. Now we do not think it necessary to dwell on the fact that this passage, which is supposed to give the key to St. Paul's anthropology, occurs in the earliest of his Epistles—in which there is no mention withal of that term which plays so important a part in the later Epistles, the *σάρξ*—or on the circumstance that the combination nowhere recurs. Nor shall we argue with Weiss that we can hardly infer the Apostle's position as respects the constituent elements of human nature regarded in itself from a passage which speaks of *Christians*, who are distinguished from other men by the possession of the Spirit of God. Nor yet do we attach much weight to the ingenious suggestion of Wendt, although it carries a certain plausibility. He calls attention to a peculiarity in the use of *πνεῦμα* by St. Paul, which he would designate as liturgical, where in the benediction at the close of certain Epistles (Gal. vi. 18; Philemon 25; 2 Tim. iv. 22), *τὸ πνεῦμα ὑμῶν* is put for the simpler *ὑμεῖς*—the spirit by synecdoche for man as a whole—and which, as only occurring in the solemn style of these concluding formulæ of blessing, he conceives may have

been adopted by St. Paul from a liturgic mode of expression then current. He throws out the conjecture that, as the Apostle was approaching the close of his letter with the benediction already, as it were, in view, the expression *ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα* occurred to him as a fuller designation instead of *ὑμεῖς*, and that then to this as the leading thought there was added the partitive specification; *καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα*. In a linguistic point of view he finds this mode of apprehending the passage confirmed by the circumstance that both the preceding *ὀλόκληρον* and the subsequent predicate *τηρηθείη* strictly refer only to *τὸ πνεῦμα* (although, it is true, this would not exclude another explanation). And in point of fact the mode of expression, which at first seems surprising, is accounted for by our recalling the special interest with which St. Paul brings into prominence the truth that the *σῶμα* is not excluded from sanctification (1 Cor. vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1). Sanctification is the very essence of his wish here; he desires that God may sanctify the Thessalonians in all that constitutes their nature (*ἀγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὀλοτελείς*) and may preserve them irreproachable (*ἀμέμπτως*)—*i. e.* furnished with all virtues. If on this occasion he used the solemn formula *ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα*, it was not immaterial for him specially to bring out that this expression was to be rightly understood in the synecdochic sense,

because the *whole* man, *including* his *σῶμα*, was to be sanctified. For that reason he appended the appositional words: "as well the soul as the body."<sup>1</sup>

This is an apt and adequate exegesis; but it is also conjectural; and we deem it better to take the simple explanation of Pfeiderer, that just as in the Gospel of St. Luke, at i. 46, 47 (in the Magnificat, which has been preserved for us, we may add, by one who was closely associated with St. Paul and has given to us, according to tradition, the Pauline gospel): "My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour," the two conceptions are placed side by side under conditions of Hebrew parallelism that make them in substance synonymous, "so St. Paul, when he would strongly emphasise the completeness of human nature, may place side by side the different expressions of popular terminology, without wishing withal to teach a philosophical trichotomy, of which no trace is found elsewhere, or could well be found on Hebrew soil."<sup>2</sup> St. Paul, says Dr. Jowett (*in loc.*), "is not writing a treatise on the soul, but pouring forth from the fulness of his heart a prayer for his converts. The words may be compared to similar expressions among ourselves; *e.g.*, 'with my heart and soul.'" "It is," says M.

<sup>1</sup> Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im Bibl. Sprachgebrauch untersucht*, p. 123 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Paulinismus*, p. 67, note.

Reuss, "to exhaust the idea of this totality, and not to give theoretical teaching as to human nature, that St. Paul names three elements, spirit, soul, and body, in place of limiting himself to two, as he does elsewhere (Rom. viii. 10 ff.; 1. Cor. vii. 34; 2. Cor. vii. 1)." But he seems to us not quite consistently to add: "Distinguished from the spirit, the soul, in St. Paul's language, comprehends the inferior faculties, the instinctive affections, the animal vitality."<sup>1</sup>

In support of this statement M. Reuss refers to 1 Cor. xv. 44 ff.; Phil. i. 27; 1 Cor. xi. 14. We find Bishop Lightfoot (on Phil. i. 28) saying: "The spirit, the principle of the higher life, is distinguished from the soul, the seat of the affections, passions, &c.," and referring for this distinction of *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* to the notes on 1 Thess. v. 23. These notes have unfortunately not yet been given to the world, and will now, it is to be feared, be too long withheld from the expectation of scholars by the pressure of other work. The terms "higher" and "lower" life are not very clear; and probably no two writers would exactly agree in defining them. But let us examine St. Paul's usage of the word *ψυχή* in the light of the Old Testament precedent on which he built.

It may be remarked that the word has undergone a certain disparagement or derogation in consequence

<sup>1</sup> La Bible, Épîtres Pauliniennes, i. p. 61.

of its being habitually associated by Baur, Lüdemann, and others with their conception of *σάρξ*. The *σάρξ*, they tell us, is *animated* matter; the *ψυχή* is essentially bound up with it, cannot emancipate itself from it, must partake its character, and the like. But, as Wendt well points out, from the fact that the conception *σάρξ* is never employed except where there is a *ψυχή* as animating principle, the converse propositions by no means follow, that with the *ψυχή* there is everywhere associated *σάρξ*, and that the meaning of *ψυχή*, where it is associated with *σάρξ*, is exhausted by its being animating principle for that *σάρξ*; and he calls attention to the fact that in the other New Testament writers the *ψυχή* is so far from being in idea bound up with the *σάρξ*, that, on the contrary, it is regarded as the proper object for the future *σωτηρία*, which lies as far remote as possible from the *σάρξ*.

But the question now before us relates to Pauline usage, and is to be determined in the light of the several passages where the expression occurs. We find, first, the Old Testament precedent followed in the employment on two occasions of *πᾶσα ψυχή* (Rom. ii. 9; xiii. 1) to denote "all individuals" from the point of view of their individual life, whereby they are marked off from inanimate nature. In this case, as in the parallel one of *πᾶσα σάρξ*, the part is put for the whole, and, though the

designation is taken from a part, the phrase really means the *whole* man. Rom. xi. 3 is expressly a quotation from the Old Testament (καὶ ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν μου); and at several other passages (Rom. xvi. 4: ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς μου, 2 Cor. i. 23: ἐπικαλοῦμαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν, 2 Cor. xii. 15: ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν, Phil. ii. 30: παραβουλεύσαμενος τῇ ψυχῇ, 1 Thess. ii. 8: ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς) we meet with precisely the same Old Testament use, according to which, as Wendt puts it, the soul forms especially the seat of the personal Ego, and is therefore emphatically employed instead of the simple personal pronoun, when the object is to name oneself or another not merely *simpliciter*, but with the special indication of value as individual personality. It will hardly be maintained that in the one, for example, of these passages where the Apostle says: "I will most gladly spend and be spent (out) for your souls," it was in respect of any partial or lower elements of his readers' personality, or of any value other than that of the life or of the man as a whole, that he expressed this willingness to spend himself. Nor can it reasonably be contended that there is any suggestion of limitation, or any note of inferiority, when the Apostle at the parallel passages, Eph. vi. 6, and Col. iii. 23, exhorts slaves to discharge their duties to their earthly masters not as a matter of eye-

service, but ἐκ ψυχῆς,<sup>1</sup> the distinctive import of which Wendt finds in the idea thereby suggested that they are to take a *personal* interest in it, as accounting it a religious duty in the service of Christ. There are several passages in the Epistle to the Philippians, where the word occurs as an element in compounds (ii. 2: σύμψυχοι, ii. 20: οὐδένα γὰρ ἔχω ἰσόψυχον), and even in the simple form (i. 27: μιᾷ ψυχῇ συναθροῦντες) to denote entire accord of feeling and sentiment, and where it signifies in one case the comfort to be derived by the Apostle from the receipt of good news (ii. 19: ἵνα καὶ γὰρ εὐψυχῶ). What warrant is there for taking the language here as restricted to the lower functions of a mere animal life-principle? Were the joint striving for the faith of the Gospel, of which the Apostle hoped to hear, or the harmony of sentiment which he asked for in order to the fulfilment of his joy, or the gratification which he hoped to get from the mission of Titus, or the sympathy of the latter with the Apostle's feelings and aims, matters belonging merely to a certain "lower" sphere of the mental life of those

<sup>1</sup> Here the Revisers of the Authorised Version have strangely thought it right to retain the rendering "heartily," "from the heart," and have thereby concealed from the English reader the fact that the Apostle emphasises his injunction by expressing it under different aspects in terms both of "heart" and "soul," and, indeed, in Eph. vi. 7, of a third form νοῦς, when he adds μετ' εὐνοίας.

concerned, in which the "higher" side of their nature might not, or need not, partake?

There remain only two other passages which bear on the question, and form in fact the mainstay of the position that *ψυχή* carries of necessity this lower meaning. They are 1 Cor. ii. 14, and xv. 44 ff., where, in each case, the adjective *ψυχικός* stands contrasted with *πνευματικός*, and certainly denotes a state or stage of man far inferior to the pneumatic, but from which it has been somewhat hastily inferred that, because *πνεῦμα* stands often in contrast with *σάρξ* and here appears similarly set overagainst *ψυχή*, *ψυχικός* must be practically treated as synonymous with *σαρκικός*. Wendt has conclusively, as it seems to us, shown the real nature of the distinction; and we give an abstract of his exposition, from which it will be apparent that the passages do not warrant the inferences drawn from them.

We need hardly say at the outset that the question is not as to the distinction between a human *πνεῦμα* and the *ψυχή*, but as to the contrast between a man determined or governed by the divine *πνεῦμα*, and one from whom that *πνεῦμα* is absent. It is generally admitted that in *πνευματικός* the divine *πνεῦμα* is, in keeping with Paul's prevailing usage, referred to; but it is argued that, because *σάρξ* is often opposed to *πνεῦμα*, the *ψυχή* here opposed to it must be closely associated with the *σάρξ*. At 1

Cor. ii. 14 we read: "Now the natural [ψυχικός] man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; and he cannot know them because they are spiritually judged [or rather, judged of]. But he that is spiritual [πνευματικός] judgeth of all things, but he himself is judged of by no one."<sup>1</sup> "The theme of the discussion in the previous section from i. 17 onward is the distinction of the Christian gospel from human or cosmic σοφία—that is, from human scientific speculation. Paul shows in i. 17 ff. that so far from Christianity having the value of a merely scientific knowledge, it appears from the standpoint of Jewish or Hellenic science absolute folly. Christianity belongs, as to its nature and value, to quite another domain; it is in the first line a δύναμις Θεοῦ (verse 18; comp. Rom. i. 16), a divine *saving power* for redemption; and the σοφία, which is coupled with this power of God (verse 24) is a σοφία Θεοῦ, a *religious view* of the world, which has nothing to do with the scientific knowledge of it. Of this general thought the Apostle, in the second chapter, gives a special application to the mode in which he himself preaches the

<sup>1</sup> This passage is greatly marred by its rendering in the Authorised Version where the same word is, in one case, rendered "discerned," and in another, "judged"; and is not so carefully amended as it might have been in the Revised, where the marginal "examine," or, perhaps, the idiomatic "judge of," is preferable to the ambiguous "judge."

gospel. He has brought forward the gospel among the Corinthians in the *first line as God's power*, without applying withal the means of human science (ii. 1-5); in the *second line* doubtless—namely, in presence of the *τελείοι*, the more mature Christians—the preaching of the gospel becomes with him too a *σοφία* (verse 6), yet even then not an earthly *σοφία*, but a *religious* speculation, whose object is the divine *plan of salvation* (verses 7-9). Such a religious view of the world is distinguished in principle from any earthly wisdom by the fact that it proceeds entirely from a revelation of the Spirit of God, because only this Spirit is able to see through the depths of the divine saving plan (verses 10-13). Thus as the *contents* of Christian *σοφία* are not of an earthly but of a divine kind, so its origin is to be found not in human cognition but in revelation of the divine Spirit.

Now, to these thoughts the words of verse 14 are immediately annexed. The whole connection treats, as we have seen, only of human cognition, in contradistinction to what is religious, divine; there is no mention either of the physical or of the moral weakness of man in relation to the Spirit of God, but only of the distance intervening between human cognition and divine wisdom. Accordingly the connection indicates that in the case of the words before us, in which there is described

negatively and positively the *organ* for the apprehension of divine wisdom, we have to think of an *organ of cognition*, and to take the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  of the  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$   $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  as the *organ of human cognition*, which, as such, is not in a position to comprehend the religious view of the world, and the place of which therefore the Spirit of God itself must take as the organ of understanding. The object of the Apostle in these words is, as is confirmed by the beginning of ch. iii., to give an explanation of the thought already expressed in ii. 6, that the communicating of the religious speculation of Christianity in preaching the gospel stands only in the *second line*, and is only destined for the more mature Christians; for it presumes that the recipients have already experienced the gospel as divine  $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ , that they have already become  $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\iota$ . This way of apprehending Christianity as speculation is the only one possible, because here only is the religious organ for apprehending it in existence; the converse way is not possible, whereby men might apprehend the gospel merely as new philosophy without having previously experienced the saving power which forms the proper essence of Christianity. On this thought alone the Apostle laid stress, and therefore he characterises the man who is not yet capable of understanding divine  $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha$  as  $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ , *i.e.*, as one who possesses in his  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  simply the

organ of purely human cognition, but has not yet the organ of religious cognition in the *πνεῦμα*.

It is only when we take the *ψυχή* in this way as the seat of the human cognitive faculty, and that in the highest sense, according to which it is the organ for all science and philosophy, that our passage obtains its proper force and significance. But how colourless would be the thought, if the *ψυχή* of the *ἄνθρωπος ψυχικός* really signified merely the animating principle of his bodily matter, in which case the existence of a human *πνεῦμα* as a higher cognitive faculty would remain a reserved point! The Apostle would then have expressed his thought after a very imperfect fashion; for the question would still remain whether man of himself did not possess in this higher *pneuma*-faculty an appropriate organ for the reception of divine wisdom. Everything depended precisely on the answer to this question being in the negative. It may seem strange that the Apostle should immediately afterwards, in applying this thought specially to the Corinthians, use the expression *σαρκικός* and no longer *ψυχικός* as a contrast to *πνευματικός*; but this will find its explanation when we come to consider his use of *σάρξ*.

The *ψυχικός* then is one in whom there dwells an earthly *ψυχή* as mental power; the *πνευματικός* one in whom dwells the divine Spirit. Wendt applies

this distinction to the explanation of the other leading passage (1 Cor. xv. 44 ff.). His view as to the exegesis of the passage as a whole, will be subjoined in the Appendix. Instead of making the discussion in this case turn on the idea of substance and on the substantial diversity between earthly and heavenly bodies, so that *σῶμα πνευματικόν* would mean a body composed of celestial luminous matter and *σῶμα ψυχικόν* a body composed of earthly psychico-sarkic matter, Wendt holds that the latter expression denotes simply a body which encloses an earthly *ψυχή*, and the former a body, in which the divine *πνεῦμα* fills the place of the earthly *ψυχή*. The adjectives denote the power—in the one case creaturely, in the other divinely spiritual—that animates the bodily organism; and the *ψυχή* is here a brief designation for the whole compass of the *non-corporeal* side of the earthly man.

But if there is thus no foundation for the distinction between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* as that between a lower and a higher element, faculty, or function in man, wherein lies the difference between them? Wendt holds that, in analogy with the distinction which he recognises between *σῶμα* and *σάρξ*, the former denoting body in general, the latter the earthly body in particular (when it is used by synecdoche for the body), “with St. Paul *πνεῦμα* is the *general term for the conception of spirit*, and may

be used as well of the earthly as of the non-earthly spirit; while  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is the designation for a *special kind of spirit*, namely, *for the earthly-creaturely spirit*. As  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  without further addition may be simply said of the earthly body, when from the connection it is clear that this and no other kind of body is in question, so is the term  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  used without more precise designation as expression for the human spirit, when the anthropological contrast of  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  or the connection otherwise already suggests the specialising of the general idea. As, again, the word  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\zeta$  is emphatically employed instead of the more general  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , when the object is definitely to distinguish the earthly body as such from a supra-terrestrial body, so we saw at the two passages, 1 Cor. ii. 14, and xv. 44 ff., the term  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  emphatically employed to place the creaturely-earthly spirit in sharp contrast to the divine Spirit. In this respect, therefore, but only in this, are  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\zeta$  and  $\psi\acute{\upsilon}\chi\eta$  homogeneous; they are akin to each other not as respects the *notion* conveyed by them, but as respects their *value*, inasmuch as they both stand at the same stage of *creatureliness* in contradistinction to God."

But, while this view of Wendt may be regarded as correct so far as it goes, it does not account for the selection of the term  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ , nor does it explain the point of view from which that term comes to be *predominantly* employed. For the explanation of that

choice we must fall back on the Old Testament, where we meet with the distinction between *nephesh* and *ruach* very marked, as resting on a difference not of contents but of the point of view from which the same contents are regarded. *Nephesh* is used of the soul looked at as an individual possession distinguishing the holder from other men and from inanimate nature; *ruach* is used where it is conceived as proceeding directly from God and returning to him. The former indicates the life-principle simply as subsistent; the latter marks its relation to God, or, as Wendt expresses it, its *religious value*. Why may we not suppose St. Paul to have made choice of, or to have preferred, the word  $\piνεῦμα$  for the simple human spirit precisely on account of this connotation—because of his regarding it, and valuing it, as thus primarily related to God?

We cannot quite agree with the peculiar position that Wendt takes up as regards this specialty of Pauline usage. He conceives that the  $\piνεῦμα$ , as used by St. Paul of the human spirit, no longer in any way betrays the Old Testament religious mode of looking at it; that it has simply the value of a second part of human nature, which may be co-ordinated with the body; and he goes so far as to say: "People are for the most part inclined to see in this anthropological application of the  $\piνεῦμα$  an essential link connecting the Pauline usage with the 'popular'

Old Testament use, while they believe that they discern a peculiar new conception of Paul in the mode in which the divine  $\piνεῦμα$  is brought forward. I would rather, on the other hand, call attention to the fact that it is just this simple use of  $\piνεῦμα$  in anthropological contrast to the body, that belongs to Paul alone, and does not find analogues either in the Old Testament *usus loquendi* or in that of the other New Testament writers."

In thus putting the case, Wendt seems to me to assume—and to assume without necessity or warrant—the very point that St. Paul has here abandoned the Old Testament line of use, that in so employing  $\piνεῦμα$  he has eliminated from it the religious element, and has treated it as a purely anthropological conception precisely equivalent to  $\psiυχή$ . Granting that it designates a part of human nature overagainst another part, the body—and it is to be observed that, while it may be co-ordinated with it, it is also from the very nature of the case differentiated and contrasted—does it follow that the designation must have all its distinctive significance discharged from it, and may carry no connotation of an import at all distinguishing it from  $\psiυχή$ ? In that case it must be held that St. Paul's employment of the expression in this sense is not only left without adequate explanation, but is, in view of all the circumstances as set forth by Wendt, almost inexplicable. If its connotation is in

nothing different from that of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , why has the Apostle employed it? Why has he gone, if we may so speak, out of his way to take up a term which he had already, after Old Testament example, turned to account for other purposes, and which in its new application could hardly fail to run a risk of—as it has in point of fact given rise to—no small misunderstanding and confusion? Why has he placed a human  $\piνε\delta\mu\alpha$  alongside of the divine, when he could easily have avoided doing so, and when he had a familiar word at hand which would have precisely expressed what he meant without incurring a suspicion of being intended to convey anything more?

And not only may we reasonably ask Dr. Wendt to explain why St. Paul should in this case have betaken himself to such a term; but we may also ask from the other side why a writer, who in other respects follows, as we have seen, so closely Old Testament precedent, should be held in this instance to have gratuitously departed from it or set it aside? Why should he have thrown off its distinctive character? Why should he have taken the word without adopting the idea associated with it? In a word, we are reduced to a choice of the alternatives: either, that he did not get the term in this use from the Old Testament at all, which nobody will maintain, seeing that its presence there is beyond all doubt, and its absence in a psychological sense from profane

Greek writers is equally indubitable ; or that he did get it from the Old Testament, in which case the presumption is that his use of it would be analogous, and the burden of showing that it no longer carries any estimate of religious value must rest on those who assert the negative. It is certain that in this case as well as in others the term came to him from the Old Testament ; and the only ground on which we can conceive him to have preferred it to  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is just that it carried with it something of that aspect of *relation to God* which it had been wont to convey. We may not have the means of precisely determining what was the special idea present to the Apostle's mind on each occasion when he so chose it as thus expressive,—whether that of origin from God, or of affinity with Him, or of destination for him, or of return to Him ; but that the term designates the soul on its God-related side, and connotes it as so related, can hardly be questioned by any one who bears in mind whence the designation came and with what sanctions the Apostle received it.

There is no need, in order to bring out this meaning, either that we should identify the human  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  with the physiological life-breath, or that we should mix it up with the action of the divine  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ , as Bishop Ellicott appears to do in his strangely-expressed note on Phil. i. 2, already quoted ;<sup>1</sup> or that

<sup>1</sup> See page 97, where the passage is quoted from the first

we should engraft on it dubious theories as to the relation in which it stands to the pneumatic influence superinduced on it in the Christian. It is enough to recognise the fact that, when St. Paul has occasion to speak of the inner side of man's nature as the correlate of body, as the sphere of the religious life, or as the recipient of grace, he prefers to designate it by a name that indicated something of its religious value, that told how it had come forth from God, and thereby suggested it as the sphere of a divine renewal, the vehicle of a higher life, the abiding temple of the Holy Spirit. Here, too, as in other matters, the Apostle faithfully keeps by the lines that Jewish usage had laid down; and we find the use extended, enlarged, generalised, but not substantially altered or transformed.

edition of his Commentary (1857). In the third edition it runs, "in the mention of the human *πνεῦμα*," instead of "in every mention."

. . . τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον . . . καὶ ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον, just as at Col. iii. 9, as having “put off the old man with his deeds (σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτοῦ) and having put on the new (τὸν νέον).” But at Gal. v. 24 the object of crucifixion on the part of those that are Christ’s is represented as being the σάρξ: “They that are Christ’s have crucified the flesh.” The σάρξ would seem therefore to be interchangeable with “the old man.” In keeping with these indications that it denotes “man such as he exists in experience,” “pre-Christian, non-renewed man,” we find that it has ascribed to it powers, activities, functions, that are more fitly predicated of man as a whole than either of the material substance of his body or of the body as such. The σάρξ has not only παθήματα and ἐπιθυμίαι (Gal. v. 24), but also θελήματα (Eph. ii. 3: ποιῶντες τὰ θελήματα τῆς σαρκός), a φρόνημα (Rom. viii. 6, 7), a νοῦς (Col. ii. 18, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦς τῆς σαρκός), as well as a σῶμα (Col. ii. 11; ἐν τῇ ἀπεκδύσει τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκός, according to the best critical text, omitting τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν).

But, while such passages mark its correlation with, or equivalence to, ἄνθρωπος, we get a further and more exact measure of its import, when we look at it under the *foil of contrast* to πνεῦμα. Not only do we meet with such sharp antithetic utterances as Gal. iii. 3: “Having begun in the Spirit, are ye