

## III.

## CRITICISM OF METHODS.

THE works to which we have called attention are marked by no small skill in the combining and interpreting of the facts; and the reader who peruses any one of them will be apt at first sight to carry away the impression of an argument as successful as it is ingenious and elaborate. But a more careful examination of their methods, and a comparison of their several results, will do much to dispel the illusion.

There are two points as to which they seem agreed, namely, in the quest of a fundamental meaning to which the Apostle's varied use of *σάρξ* may be referred, and in the disposition to trace in that use a certain influence of Hellenistic philosophy. But, though they start from common ground, they reach very diverse and even opposite conclusions.

While they are not quite at one even as to the basis of the idea, they differ widely in their views as to the relation of the Jewish and Hellenic elements that are conceived to have moulded the Apostle's

thought. Baur points to an apparently indirect influence of ancient Greek philosophic ideas (p. 144). Holsten finds directly and throughout the speculative categories of Hellenism. Schmidt regards the Hellenic modes of thought as materially modified in their direction and application by the Apostle's Old Testament training. Lüdemann discovers the two lines of thought running side by side, the Apostle expressing himself sometimes in terms of the one, sometimes in terms of the other, without any attempt to combine or to reconcile them. Pfeiderer contrives a bridge of his own to facilitate the Apostle's passing from the one to the other.

Not less divergent are their anthropological conclusions. With Baur the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  is almost merged in the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ , but is "at all events non-material, and so far pneumatic in the widest sense of the term"; the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  is its spiritual element. With Holsten not only the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , but also the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  and  $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$  belong to the side of the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ . With Lüdemann the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  and  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  go to form the outer, the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  and  $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$  to constitute the inner, man. As to the human  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  Baur holds that although spoken of, it has no real significance. Holsten cannot recognise it as an element of man at all. Lüdemann holds it to be the indifferent subject of personal life, the substance of the inner man. Pfeiderer affirms it to be in substance

equivalent to  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , the higher principle being in his view the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ . Schmidt resolves it into the general notion of "spirit," and leaves it without more precise definition.

It need not surprise us, if under such circumstances each writer, who advances his own solution of the problem with considerable confidence and, in some cases, strength of self-assertion, should not be at all disposed to acquiesce in the validity of the conclusions arrived at by the others. And it may be well, before we proceed, just to note a few of the judgments thus passed by one on another, and to observe how each paves the way for his own structure by more or less demolishing those of his predecessors. Dr. Baur<sup>1</sup> had affirmed—and not unreasonably, as we shall see by and by—that in place of his own simple concrete view (viz. that  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  is just the body) Holsten "has put abstract definitions, which, however correct, take already for granted the fundamental assumptions on which they rest." Holsten retaliates by asserting that Baur's "definition of the idea is erroneous," that he has "confounded  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  and  $\tau\omicron\delta\ \sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \sigma\alpha\rho\acute{\kappa}\omicron\varsigma$ ," and that, while accepting individual points from Holsten's investigation, he has ignored, set aside, or rejected what Holsten himself considers his "decisive re-

<sup>1</sup>Theologisches Literaturblatt, 1857, No. 42, as quoted by Holsten at p. 369.

sults" as to the categories of matter, substance, and the finite. Schmidt, besides effectually showing the utterly forced and unnatural character of the exegesis applied by Holsten to the passages where a human *πνεῦμα* seems referred to, declares himself at variance with Holsten's leading conclusions as to the contrast of flesh and spirit being convertible into that of finite and infinite, as to the identification of *σάρξ* with evil, and as to the introduction of the doctrine of objective *ἁμαρτία* at Rom. v. 12. Lüdemann refuses in numerous instances to accept Holsten's interpretations, and has conclusively proved that no such dualism as Holsten posits is chargeable against St. Paul, and that Holsten's own "Jewish-Hellenistic" view is neither Jewish nor Hellenistic. Pfeiderer repudiates Holsten's cardinal doctrine of the *σάρξ* embracing the whole man as a "decidedly un-Pauline, Manichæo-Flacian exaggeration."

As regards Schmidt, Lüdemann pronounces his main view—which reduces the Apostle's doctrine of redemption to annihilation of the *σάρξ*—as "artificial, scholastic, and utterly void of inner consistency";<sup>1</sup> and Pfeiderer says of his position as to Rom. viii. 3 that, "ignoring (under pretext of being scientific!) the Pauline mysticism of faith, it cuts through the religious roots of the Pauline soteriology, and ulti-

<sup>1</sup> *Anthropologie des Apostel Paulus*, p. 123, note.

mately retains a mere dry scholastic theorem, leaving it inexplicable how such a thought should ever have made an impression on religious humanity.”<sup>1</sup> And—*mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*—Lüdemann himself is destined to experience similar treatment at the hands of Pfeiderer, who says of his singular attempt to make out the standpoint of Rom. i.—iv. as incompatible with that of Rom. vi.—viii.: “This opinion of Lüdemann I can only hold to be a fantastic blunder (*einen wunderlichen Fehlgriff*),” and in opposition to it lays down thus clearly the true state of the case: “The view given in the second portion (of the Epistle, vi.—viii.) is simply introduced *in addition to*, and *not instead of*, the first; and it is far from being brought in, as if here and now the earlier doctrine of the righteousness of faith were to be annulled, and a bran-new doctrine of moral righteousness were to be substituted for it. On the contrary, the real *πνεῦμα*-righteousness and the ideal righteousness of faith stand in the position of a new religious relation to God and a new moral life, neither of which can take the place of the other, but which are necessarily required as reciprocally complementary, and that, moreover, in such a way that the religious idea always remains the foundation and—for the Apostle, as for the religious point of view at all times—the main thing.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Paulinismus, p. 113, note.      <sup>2</sup> Paulinismus, p. 210, note.

It is obvious that theories, which issue in results so incongruous and conflicting, cannot together or equally present to us the thought of St. Paul. And, when we consider their bearing on the character and teaching of the Apostle, we can hardly regard them as carrying antecedent probability or as otherwise than on the face of them open to grave suspicion. Is it at all feasible, for example, to suppose that one, whose whole later life turned on the fact of redemption and was spent in the effort to persuade men to receive it, should have based his teaching on positions that, logically applied, *preclude its possibility?* on the positions, that *ἀμαρτία* is of itself essential to the *σάρξ*, and that *finitum non est capax infiniti*—which would seem to postulate in the strictest sense a new creation? If man is nothing but *σάρξ*, and Christ came to do away with the *σάρξ*, what is left to be redeemed or to lay hold of redemption? This is the natural question that arises for one who consistently follows out Holsten's theory. In point of fact, Holsten is not thus consistent; sometimes man is identified by him with the "flesh"; sometimes he is spoken of as a subject distinguishable from it. Lüdemann well asks, "But what is *man*, in Holsten's view, apart from the flesh?" Holsten has, at least, no right to insist that St. Paul shall be involved in the inconsistencies of his expositor.

Can anyone, again, think it likely that St. Paul knew so little what he meant to say as frequently to use *πνεῦμα* in a more general sense, to which no definite idea can be attached, or to leave it in many cases uncertain whether he was speaking from an abstract ideal point of view of the contrast between the material body and the immaterial life-spirit of man, or from an empirico-real point of view of the contrast between the flesh that conditions the character of existing humanity, and the divine Spirit transcending it? Can we suppose the Apostle to have taken refuge in the indefiniteness which Schmidt would impute to him? Turning to the choice that Lüdemann gives us, is it conceivable that the mind of the Apostle should have oscillated, as it is alleged to have done, between the wider Jewish and the narrower Hellenic use of *σάρξ*? that it should have passed under the domination now of the one, now of the other? and that the alternating currents should have succeeded each other so rapidly as to be repeatedly reflected—to the perplexity of the expositor—in the course of a single letter? Has Dr. Lüdemann persuaded any one else than himself of the possibility—to say nothing of the probability—of the explanation which he gives of the structure of the Epistle to the Romans? Lastly, coming to Pfleiderer, apart from all else, can we deem it at all likely that the Apostle

should have given an historical explanation of the origin of sin in Rom. v. and a psychological explanation of its origin in chapter vii., which constitute a formal contradiction, without being aware of, or concerning himself about, the "unreconciled antinomy"? One is tempted, in presence of such a suggestion, to apply the pointed remark of Holsten, in reference to a similar "unresolved antinomy" to which Baur has recourse: "To assume really an antinomy at the very centre of religious thought (*der Weltanschauung*) in the case of a mind like St. Paul's is simply a proof of our being ourselves in error."<sup>1</sup>

Above all, the supposition, which more or less underlies all these theoretical constructions of the Apostle's doctrine—that it contains elements or reflects influences of Greek philosophy—is, in view of what we otherwise know of him, I shall not say, utterly incredible—for there can be no doubt of his having had some measure of Greek culture, and "he who became all things to all men that he might gain some," might possibly find in it elements which he could, consistently with his "being under the law to Christ," turn to account for his ends—but is at any rate in the last degree improbable. Can it be thought a likely thing that one, who was constantly placing his aims and his methods in direct contrast to those of the world's wisdom,

<sup>1</sup> *Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus*, p. 442.

should array himself in its clothing, borrow its ideas, or imitate its language? If he did not pour contempt on all its pride, he denounced it as folly, when put into the balance with that higher wisdom which he was commissioned to impart.

We do not lay stress merely on the emphatic assertion of the Apostle that he determined "to know nothing save Jesus Christ and Him crucified," or his disclaimer of glorying save in the cross of Christ, though it is difficult to conceive language of stronger or more unqualified negation. Nor do we think it necessary to adduce the vehement denunciations of misleading and unhealthful teaching in the Pastoral Epistles, or the special warnings directed against philosophy associated with vain deceit in the Epistle to the Colossians—however forcibly they are expressed, and however powerfully they may seem to tell in favour of our argument—partly because they may be taken to point to some special and abnormal condition of the period or church referred to, and partly because I am aware that most of those with whom we are dealing would not grant the validity of an appeal to works, in their judgment, of doubtful genuineness.

Let us take the First Epistle to the Corinthians, where it is admitted on all hands that the recurring expressions, "wisdom of words" (i. 17), "wisdom of the world" (i. 21), "wise after the flesh" (i. 26), "man's wisdom" (ii. 13), "wisdom of this world"

(iii. 19), " reasonings of the wise " (iii. 20), which are of the most general character and unrestricted in reference, can only point to the philosophy, dialectic, and rhetoric of the current Greek schools. Can it be thought that the Apostle, who declared that " God chose the foolish things of the world, to put to shame them that are wise," that he himself " came not with excellency of speech or wisdom," that the wisdom spoken by him among the full-grown was " a wisdom not of this world, nor of the rulers of this world"; that he who issued the solemn warning: " Let no man deceive himself; if any man thinketh that he is wise among you in this world, let him become a fool that he may become wise: for the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God," would betake himself to the world's wisdom which he had thus pronounced incompatible with the simplicity of the gospel? His words seem to indicate not a mere abstinence for local or temporary reasons from a course otherwise or elsewhere admissible, but a fundamental antagonism resting on the belief that the " faith " of the church should not stand in the " wisdom of men but in the power of God," and that by a resort to those expedients of fleshly wisdom the " cross of Christ would be made void."

In the face of such explicit statements as to the principles that guided him as a wise master

builder, who felt himself entitled to bid others take heed how they built on the one foundation and pointed them to the fiery trial awaiting each man's work, how can we suppose him to have nevertheless drawn his thoughts from, and moulded his language on, Hellenic philosophy? Are we to assume that, while he was assuring his readers that he had "renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness nor handling the word of God deceitfully," he was consciously sitting as a partial disciple at the feet of the very men whose reasonings he had just pronounced to be, in the language of Scripture, vain? Or are we to conceive of the matter, as if he had become a philosopher, so to speak, in spite of himself, and had cast his ideas into a philosophic mould without knowing it or meaning it? The former alternative is incredible on ethical grounds; the latter can hardly be deemed possible in the case of the clear and penetrating intellect that asks: "Who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man, which is in him?" We prefer to accept St. Paul's own assurance that he had not received the spirit of the world, and that he did not speak in words taught to him by man's wisdom.

But, if we are thus compelled by a due regard to St. Paul's own language to hold such an influence of Greek philosophy, as is assumed, to be either ex

cluded or reduced to an indirect and unconscious minimum, we may fairly demur to the relevancy, at least in the first instance, of the categories and methods of philosophy as guides to the apprehension of his meaning.

And this brings us to the first objection which we are disposed to take to the method of the works before us. With considerable difference of degree certainly, but all of them to some extent, they import into their exegesis the canons, processes, and nomenclature of philosophy. It is no part of our present purpose to inquire what are the relations that ought to subsist between philosophy and theology; nor shall we presume to take exception to an application of philosophical categories and methods to the *results* of exegesis, if those who so apply them are persuaded that they can thereby understand the results better, or explain them more clearly. Let exegesis fulfil its function and complete its task; and let the product then be handed over to whom it may concern. What we here take exception to is not the separate and independent handling of theological topics by appropriate philosophical methods, but the intermingling of the philosophical and exegetical processes, to the confusion and detriment of both. It is difficult in such a case to determine how much belongs to the one factor, and how much to the other; how far the

theory is the outcome of pure and unbiassed interpretation ; how far the exegesis on the other hand may have been moulded and warped by the exigencies of the preconceived theory. The risk of this confusion is especially great when, as in several of the works before us, the writer attempts to engraft on his exposition of the facts an explanation of their genesis. If we come with our ready-made categories of system, we shall be but too apt to find what we expect, and to make the facts fit into them, or to pronounce it so much the worse for the facts.

Of the latter we meet a very striking illustration furnished by Holsten. His theory requires him throughout to interpret *πνεῦμα* of the divine Spirit, and, on finding it impossible to attach that sense to it in 2 Cor. vii. 1 without assuming the divine Spirit to be capable of defilement, he has no scruple in suggesting that the passage should be set aside as a spurious addition to the text, although there is not the slightest vestige of other ground for impeaching its genuineness. As St. Paul himself does not make use of the terms "matter," or "substance," or "the finite,"—although, had he wished to do so, he could easily have found the needful words—it may well be conceived that the terms which he does employ do not lend themselves very readily to the scientific fetters imposed on them ; and the con-

sequence is that the categories, to which they are referred with an affectation of great precision, exhibit under the exigencies of practical manipulation a wonderful elasticity. We are told ever so often that the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  is nothing but the body, the material body; but soon we find the admission extorted by the necessities of exegesis that the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  is equivalent to, if not synonymous with, "man." Nothing can exceed the iteration with which we are assured that the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  is throughout the matter or substance of the earthly body; but we have not proceeded far before we find it filled with life, instinct with emotion, putting forth energies of desire and thought and will, exhibiting, in fact, all the activities that are more especially associated with the idea of "spirit"—the suggestion of which, however, is dismissed with the assurance that it is at bottom mere bodily matter and nothing more!

Pfleiderer holds that in many instances  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  denotes simply non-pneumatic (*geistlose*) substance, but he meets with other cases where it is needful to take it as "anti-pneumatic" (*geistwidrige*) substance; and he apparently reckons the transition from the one sense to the other so easy that it needs—as it certainly receives—no explanation. He vouchsafes nothing more than the assertion: "It was withal already in itself natural" (*es lag doch schon an sich nahe*; on such occasions with our German friends

*schon* plays a large part for so modest a particle); and, after repeating the assertion two or three times that it may produce its effect *non vi sed saepe cadendo*, he tells us to our no small astonishment: "Thus we know in fact already how (*so wissen wir ja schon, wie*—*schon* reinforced this time by *ja*) the non-pneumatic passive becomes immediately at the same time the anti-pneumatic active matter."<sup>1</sup> Dr. Pfeiderer, who is fond of throwing bridges over psychological chasms, and seems even at times to make the chasm for the pleasure of bridging it over, might have helped us to conceive how the passive becomes thus immediately active, and the non-pneumatic thus at the same time anti-pneumatic. I confess that to my mind a slight infusion of a pneumatic element in the form of a perverse human will would make the transition more readily intelligible. So much for the category of *σάρξ*, which must be rigidly defined as "matter of the body," but may elastically include, and exercise, all the functions of mind!

Let us now glance for a moment at the correlative term *σῶμα*, which is assigned to the category of "form," and stands, as such, contrasted with *σάρξ*, "substance." Holsten insists that *σῶμα* has, through-

<sup>1</sup>"So wissen wir ja schon wie dem Paulus die geistlos passive Materie unmittelbar zugleich die geistwidrig aktive ist."—Paulinismus, p. 62.

out, its qualitative characteristic in the conception of "form"; and he has an elaborate note,<sup>1</sup> in which he ingeniously attaches to this conception of "form" the further qualifications of "organic," "living," "material," "outward," "apparent," "dead," according as they seem to be requisite from the context of the several passages. But he comes to the case of Col. ii. 17: "which are the shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ," where, if *σῶμα* means anything, it means the very substance, the real and essential, in contrast to the idea of mere form, of shadow without substance. He admits that there is here what he calls "an interesting transition" to the idea of substance; but, in order to keep by his definition, he betakes himself to a novel category of "substantial form," whatever that may mean. When the category of "form" will obviously not suffice, he tells us that the idea of *σῶμα* on such occasions "shares the definite quality (*Bestimmtheit*) of its substance"; but what is this but borrowing at pleasure from the one category as much as he happens to wish to import into the other? and what in that case is the use of insisting on the distinction? The passage Rom. viii. 13, as to "mortifying the deeds of the body:" τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦτε, is plainly, as it stands, out of keeping with Holsten's definition; but he gets over the difficulty by in-

<sup>1</sup> Zum. Evang. d. Paulus u. d. Petrus, pp. 376, 377.

serting, on each occasion when he adduces the passage, the words “τῆς σαρκός” in brackets after σώματος, as if St. Paul had inadvertently omitted them, or as if there were a necessity, in the light of the context, that we should insert them—which is simply an avoidance of the question raised by the presence of σώματος where we should expect σαρκός.

Let us turn next to the other side of the contrast. We naturally expect that, if the “flesh” is “matter,” the πνεῦμα opposed to it will be defined as “non-matter,” as something immaterial. And so it is after a fashion. We learn from Holsten<sup>1</sup> that “the πνεῦμα is an ἀόρατον” (Rom. i. 20, where, however, nothing is said of the πνεῦμα, but the Apostle has himself specified the ἀόρατα as God’s “eternal power and θειότης”); and “on this immateriality rests the freedom from all that is material, primarily the ἄφθαρτον and αἰδίον.” But it is conceived that this immateriality is “not freedom from all substantiality,” because of the passages that present the communication of the Spirit as an efflux of something *substantial*, combined with a real effect. “In this way a certain materiality slips again into the conception, and the immateriality of the πνεῦμα becomes at bottom merely the negative of ‘cosmic’ earthly matter.” “The πνεῦμα,” says

<sup>1</sup> Zum. Evang. d. Paulus u. d. Petrus, p. 378.

Lüdemann, "is at the same time expressive of a higher materiality";<sup>1</sup> and Pfeleiderer says, "It can only be called relatively immaterial, as it is not earthly sensuous, but heavenly supra-sensuous matter (*Stofflichkeit*)."<sup>2</sup> The *πνεῦμα* as well as the *σάρξ* is referred to the category of substance; and when we come to speak of matter, the *πνεῦμα* is in a sense material also—only higher, finer, transcendent, celestial. In this way the philosophic expositor finds himself at liberty to interpret *πνεῦμα* either in the sense of the "relatively immaterial" or of the "relatively material" as it may best suit him. One cannot help suspecting that the same standard is not always applied to the Apostle's language; sometimes it is weighed in the scales of modern psychological distinctions; sometimes it is tried by the standard of the Greek ideas of the time; sometimes the Apostle is credited with the nicest and most delicate discrimination in the use of terms; at others he is held to have contented himself with the "Jewish-vulgar" anthropology.

In keeping with the tendency to lay down stringent categories, which are subsequently widened or relaxed as the case may require, all the writers except Lüdemann deem it necessary to start from and constantly return to the assumption, in the case

<sup>1</sup> Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Paulinismus, p. 200.

of  $\sigma\rho\xi$  at least, of a fundamental signification underlying its use, although they do not clearly explain what they mean by this. Baur postulates a "fundamental notion" (*Grundbegriff*); Holsten a "cardinal signification" (*prinzipielle Bedeutung*—that from which, assumed as a principle, the others may be derived); Schmidt an "original contents" (*ursprünglicher Inhalt*); Pfeiderer a "fundamental signification" (*Grundbedeutung*). One would be glad to know what is the precise idea attached to these words. They can hardly be employed in the purely etymological or lexical sense. A lexicographer, such as Grimm or Littré, recording the history of a word, traces it back to its root and earliest mode of use, and evolves thence the succession of the several meanings or shades of meaning gradually associated with it. But in this case we are concerned not with the historical genesis of the word, or the record of its earlier applications, which might possibly throw little more light on existing usage than an inquiry into the origin of the terms "idiocy" or "lunacy" would shed on a modern medical treatise dealing with these subjects. Such researches have at most a very subordinate place and value as compared with the investigation of that actual usage—*usus, quem penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi*; and they only contribute indirectly to the solution of the problem in so far as they help us to trace the

growth of that usage. The meaning of a word as used by St. Paul can only be got from his own writings. We take it therefore that, when the "fundamental signification" is spoken of, it is the fundamental signification that is conceived to govern Pauline usage. But this leads us to ask how, in that case, it is arrived at. Is it drawn from the standpoint of the expositor, and does it reflect his peculiar theory? If so, it may be little better than an arbitrary assumption—a mere begging of the question. Does it profess to be taken from St. Paul and to give his own key to his meaning? In that case it would seem to be most naturally reached at the close of the inquiry, rather than laid down at the beginning; or, if assumed at the outset, it should be merely treated as a working hypothesis to be verified in the sequel. I do not find any indication of its being thus reached or so treated; but there are signs not a few that the fundamental view is quite as much imported as educed—with the result of controlling the exegesis or hampering its free play, preventing the acceptance of its natural results, or straining it in support of conclusions brought from another domain.

And this leads me to present some specimens of the methods and processes by which exegesis is made to yield the desired results. Holsten and Lüdemann especially insist that *ἀμαρτία* as used

by St. Paul denotes what they call *objective ἁμαρτία*—that is, not sin regarded collectively or generically as a principle at work in man, but sin regarded as a necessity inherent in man's constitution as such—in other words not what we call "sin," but what we call "evil." And they adduce especially two passages as warranting this position. At Rom. v. 12 St. Paul says: "δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε." Baur remarks that the *παρακοή* and *παράβασις* of Adam can only be understood of the sin-principle, which was from the beginning immanent in the flesh, emerging into actuality in Adam.<sup>1</sup> Holsten renders or paraphrases the passage: "through one man (objective) sin (manifesting itself in his *παράβασις*) entered (as a real thing) into the world (of the visible);"<sup>2</sup> and Lüdemann comes to a substantially similar conclusion.<sup>3</sup> But, as is sufficiently obvious, the words inserted by way of explicating the meaning contain the very thought on which Holsten's position entirely depends; and there is in the passage itself not the slightest hint of them. St. Paul says: "sin entered into the world"; Holsten makes him say: "objective

<sup>1</sup> Vorlesungen über Neutest. Theol., p. 191.

<sup>2</sup> Zum Evang. d. Petrus u. d. Paulus, p. 413.

<sup>3</sup> Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus, p. 88: "Beim Stammvater war seine ἁμαρτία keine strafällige Einzelthat, παράβασις, sondern, wie bei den Nachkommen, eine objective Beschaffenheit seiner Natur."

sin entered into the world of the visible, that is, came into manifestation as a reality." But this is not all. According to the doctrine thus ascribed to St. Paul the *ἁμαρτία* conceived as objective sin was already in existence from the very first as a reality in the *κόσμος*—was already, before the emergence of Adam's transgression, immanent in man's sensuous nature. It could not therefore be said *εἰσέρχεται εἰς τὸν κόσμον* without imposing on that phrase a meaning entirely foreign to it. When we say that a thing enters into the world, we must certainly be held to mean that something *comes in* which was *not there before*; and not merely that something, which had already been long in the world, had at length become manifest in it. Besides, according to the very definition of the difference between *ἁμαρτία* and *παράβασις* given by those writers, we should have expected the latter term rather than the former to have been used with *εἰσῆλθε*, for it was the *transgression* that *came in*, the *ἁμαρτία* was there *ab initio*. Then it is difficult to account for the preposition *διά* under Holsten's exegesis; it is not said merely: *in* Adam or *with* Adam sin became manifested or actual; but expressly *through* him, by means of his instrumentality or agency, which would seem to point at sin's having become present or operative in him in the first instance not as an outcome of necessity, but as the result of his per-

sonal action. We can scarcely conceive the laws of language subjected to a more violent strain; and we can hardly be surprised that Schmidt should here decline to follow his leaders,<sup>1</sup> and that Pfeiderer should declare Lüdemann's interpretation of the passage, which is an elaborate expansion of Holsten's, to betray itself mistaken by its very want of clearness. Pfeiderer condemns the attempt to bring in the doctrine of the *σάρξ* as the natural principle of sin at a passage which simply deals with its historic origin, as tending only to confusion; acknowledges that Ernesti is here in the right; and admits that the immediate sense of the passage and of the context is opposed to the conception of an objective sin-principle preceding the first sin of Adam, "for the words 'sin entered into the world' undeniably imply the coming in of a new thing, which consequently was not there at all previously."<sup>2</sup>

The other passage on which this doctrine is engrafted is Rom. vii. 9: *χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία νεκρά . . . ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς, ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀνέζησεν*—which is explained to mean that *objective* sin previously to the action of the law is latent, potential, but at the presence of the commandment comes to consciousness as what it is, becomes subjectively realised as transgression. But this interpretation imports its essential elements into the passage only

<sup>1</sup> Paulinische Christologie, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Paulinismus, p. 45.

by disregarding the proper import of *νεκρά* and the force of the preposition in *ἀνέζησεν*; and Hilgenfeld deserves at least the credit of superior consistency when he holds that sin which is described as *dead* and is said to *revive* must have had a previous life, and accordingly interprets it of sin in a pre-existent state. This view of his can hardly be entertained, for there is no trace of anything analogous to it in the Apostle's writings elsewhere; but whatever may be the precise meaning of the figure—which it is not our object now to discuss—this much is clear, that by no ordinary canons of exegesis can *νεκρά* mean “potential,” which is a modern philosophical phrase, constructed as a sort of *tertium quid* between possibility and necessity.

Lüdemann finds an exegetic support for his peculiar theory—that the first portion of the Epistle to the Romans as to justification by faith represents a Jewish standpoint, which the Apostle no longer accepts as his own—in Rom. v. 2, where St. Paul, after having said in verse 1: “Therefore having been justified by faith, we have peace (or, let us have peace) with God through our Lord Jesus Christ,” is supposed to make the transition to the opposite view of ethical righteousness, which is really his own, in the words: *δι’ οὗ καὶ τὴν προσαγωγὴν ἐσχήκαμεν τῇ πίστει εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν, καὶ κευχόμεθα ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ.*

After laying by means of spaced type a stress on the words "have *had* access *by means of the faith into this grace*," which there is nothing in the original to warrant, he says: "It is evident that the faith and the juridical justification acquired by it only first procures access to *the* grace [*nur erst den Zutritt verschafft zu DER Gnade*] whereby we become part-takers of the real new creation." And he adds: "Only thus is explained the *καὶ*, which indicates a new thing, only thus the perfect *ἔσχήκαμεν*, and the presents *ἑστήκαμεν* and *καυχώμεθα*."<sup>1</sup> The suggestion is, that the faith in juridical justification as set forth up to this point, but not recurring afterwards in the three following chapters, is simply the means of bringing men from a Jewish standpoint to the real benefits of grace and new life to be got through union with Christ, and that, having served its purpose, it may now be discarded as having no further value. Upon this we remark, 1st, that the hinge of the whole argument turns upon the presence of the words *τῇ πίστει*, on which Dr. Lüdemann has imposed so peculiar a sense; but it is very doubtful whether they form a genuine part of the text. They do not occur in BDEFG, are omitted by Griesbach and Lachmann, and are bracketed by Westcott and Hort; and they have all the appearance of a gloss. But, 2nd, assuming them to be genuine, they

<sup>1</sup> Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus, pp. 208, 209.

cannot without forcing bear the emphasis laid on them. There is no statement that faith *procures* the access, and still less is there warrant for the "only first procures" which Lüdemann inserts. The stress lies on the *access* and on *Christ* as procuring it. 3rd. His position requires that we take the *χάρις ταύτην* as referring not, as one should naturally expect, to the grace experienced in justification, which had been specially referred to at iii. 25, was resumed in part by the *δικαιώθεντες* in v. 1, and is now pointed to in the *ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν* with a certain triumphant sense of present possession, but to a *χάρις*, the real nature of which was only to be developed in the sequel. 4th, He attaches the clause *καὶ καυχώμεθα* to *ἐστήκαμεν* which is a mere adjunct to *χάρις ταύτην*, whereas the great majority of expositors place it with far more probability in connection either with the *ἐσχίκαμεν* or, better still, with the principal sentence *εἰρήνην ἔχομεν* in verse 1. 5th, The *καὶ* is said to indicate something new, which is true in a sense, but not in such a sense as to constitute a basis for Lüdemann's inference from it. It might denote something added to what goes before, or might even be construed as carrying a certain climactic force; but it is most probably to be taken, as it is taken by Meyer, of the "also" of the *corresponding relation*, bringing out more definitely and prominently the

significance of the mediation of Christ as the ground of our having our peace through Him. In any case it must introduce something in the same line or direction with what precedes; and not aught opposed to, contrasting with, or superseding it, as on Lüdemann's theory we would expect. If Lüdemann's view is correct, the Apostle must have so effectually disguised his meaning that it has utterly escaped the notice of all that have sought to reach it for eighteen hundred years.

Akin to Lüdemann's discovery here is his curious suggestion as to the Apostle's use of the phrase *μὴ γένοιτο*. He regards this expression as used by the Apostle, in what he terms truly Socratic irony, to effect under cover of the same word a change of the ideas denoted by it, or to pass from the one to the other, whereby the Apostle, after making an apparent concession, is enabled to neutralise it or turn it against an opponent.<sup>1</sup> This solution, under which the Apostle escapes from the consequences of an argument by deprecating the result but withal shifting his ground, is more creditable to the ingenuity of the expositor than to the ingenuousness of the Apostle; and, although the phrase may not have the deprecatory strength which is conveyed by its unfortunate rendering in the Authorised Version, we see no reason to doubt that the Apostle is speak-

<sup>1</sup> Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus, pp. 158, 167, 169 *al.*

ing in earnest, and that, had he been made aware of the ironical equivocation which was to be imputed to him, he would have repelled it with a *μὴ γένοιτο*. Holsten, who does not hesitate to charge St. Paul with "dialectic sophistry," is in this case more just, when he describes it as the object of the formula to repel with a certain emotion an inference drawn from a true and real presupposition—an inference which is *logically possible, but in reality untrue and violating the religious consciousness*.<sup>1</sup>

An instance of a different character may be subjoined, where Dr. Lüdemann builds an important negative inference on an alleged parallelism of expression. He argues that St. Paul, who at 2 Cor. xi. 3 brings Eve, but not Adam, into contact with the serpent, must have declined to accept the intervention of the devil in the fall of man, because Rom. v. 12 is evidently written under reminiscence of, and with reference to, the Book of Wisdom ii. 24. The words of the latter are : *φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, while at Rom. v. 12 the words run : *δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος*. Here, we are told that the "sound of the words is in part so similar that the variation (*Abweichung*) can only be intentional";<sup>2</sup> and it is suggested that St.

<sup>1</sup> Zum Evang. d. Petrus u. d. Paulus, p. 433, note.

<sup>2</sup> Anthropologie des Ap. Paulus, p. 93.

Paul made the change to ignore the reference to the devil. But the resemblance extends only to the common use of the phrase "entered into the world," which might have been employed by any two writers desirous of giving expression to the same idea, without the slightest influence of the one on the other. Most people would deem the case one of accidental and unconscious coincidence almost unavoidable under the circumstances. The suggestion as to the variation being intentional is simply gratuitous, for in the parallelism between the death that had come through Adam and the life that had come through Christ there was no occasion to introduce mention of the tempter, and the omission cannot reasonably be construed into an indication of St. Paul's opinion on the subject.

Before leaving this question of exegetical methods, we may simply call attention to the disposition which appears more or less in all of the expositors we have named, to rest important conclusions on their own interpretation of texts confessedly among the most difficult, and of the most controverted character, to be found in Scripture—such as that in 2 Cor. iii. 17 : *ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν*, or that in Rom. viii. 10 : *τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν δι' ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην*, or, as a source of light for the ordinary use of *πνεῦμα* in the first instance, the eschatological statements of St. Paul

in 1 Cor. xv.—with the result, as it seems to me, of substituting problematic and theoretical constructions for the surer conclusions which may be drawn from passages that are admittedly more clear, and that have more immediate relation to the Christian life on earth.

Very different in character, methods, and results is the most recent contribution to the literature of the subject—a monograph published by Dr. Wendt of Göttingen in the year 1878, entitled, “The Ideas of Flesh and Spirit in Biblical usage investigated.”<sup>1</sup> In this treatise, which had been preceded by a partial discussion of the question, as regards the Old Testament, in an academic dissertation,<sup>2</sup> he enters upon a careful and unbiassed study of the Biblical facts, and reaches conclusions similar in general character to those of Ritschl and of Weiss, but based on a fuller and closer examination of the Old Testament, the extra-Pauline, and the Pauline usage. It is a work of much exegetical skill, acute criticism, and sobriety of judgment, temperate in tone, and, so far as it is polemic, a model of courteous controversy. We shall have frequent occasion to refer to its researches and their results in the sequel.

<sup>1</sup> Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch untersucht von Lic. Dr. H. H. Wendt, 8vo, Gotha, 1878.

<sup>2</sup> Entitled: “Notiones carnis et spiritus, quomodo in Vetere Testamento adhibeantur, exponantur,” printed, but not published, at Göttingen in 1877.

As a matter of course the subject falls to be handled, though necessarily after a less full and minute fashion, in the various works dealing with Biblical Theology in general, with the teaching of the Apostles, or with the doctrinal teaching of St. Paul in particular. The most important of the general treatises are the classic works of Édouard Reuss of Strassburg<sup>1</sup> and of Dr. Bernhard Weiss of Berlin.<sup>2</sup> A minor but far from inconsiderable value belongs to the book of M. Sabatier on "The Apostle Paul,"<sup>3</sup> and to various smaller monographs that have been at different times devoted to sections of the subject.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Histoire de la Théologie Chrétienne au siècle apostolique*, troisième édition, 1864. It seems strange that nearly twenty years should have elapsed without a new edition of this masterpiece of the venerable author, who unites in his own person the most characteristic qualities of the two nations to which, in virtue of his border abode in Strassburg and of his bilingual literary activity, he may be said to belong—the accuracy and depth of German research, the order and clearness of French exposition.

<sup>2</sup> *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 3rd edition, Berlin, 1880, by far the best book on the subject. A translation, in two volumes, by the Rev. David Eaton, and the Rev. James E. Duguid, has recently been issued in the Foreign Theological Library of Messrs. Clark, Edinburgh.

<sup>3</sup> *L'Apôtre Paul*. 12° Paris, 1879.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix for a brief notice of the literature bearing on the points in question.